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Public awareness of global warming, as the most frightening and visible 
aspect of the global ecological crisis, has increased dramatically in the 
last several years. This most recent phase of ecological awareness has 
been brought about primarily by the scientific community (especially 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), religious leaders 
worldwide, Jared Diamond’s best-selling Collapse, environmental 
journalists such as Bill Moyers, Bill McKibben, and Mark Hertsgaard, 
and now Al Gore’s global warming documentary. As Rajenda Pachauri, 
head of the Intergovernmental Panel, said last year, “We are risking the 
ability of the human race to survive.” But lest we get obsessed 
exclusively with global warming, Diamond lists twelve problems 
(including human overpopulation, biodiversity, and wild habitat loss 
which results in a critical loss of ecosystem services, as well as global 
warming) each of which, he claims, is capable of bringing about the 
global collapse of civilization.1 British scientist James Lovelock 
recently warned that “there must be no more natural habitat destruction 
anywhere . . . the natural ecosystems of the Earth sustain the climate 
and chemistry of the planet.” 
In his critique of sustainable development, environmental historian 
Donald Worster pointed out that:  
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back in the 1960s and 1970s, the goal [of the most thoughtful leaders] of 
environmentalism . . . was to save the living world around us, millions of species 
of plants and animals, including humans, from destruction by our technology, 
population, and appetites. The only way to do that . . . was to think the radical 
thought that there must be limits to growth in three area . . . limits to population, 
limits to technology, and limits to appetite and greed. Underlying this insight was 
a growing awareness that the progressive, secular materialist philosophy on which 
modern life rests, indeed on which Western civilization has rested for the past 
three hundred years, is deeply flawed and ultimately destructive to ourselves and 
the whole fabric of life on the planet. 
This necessary coupling of population, consumption, and technology 
with limits to growth was made in 1971 by Stanford biologist Paul 
Ehrlich and University of California Berkeley physicist John Holdren in 
their famous I=PAT equation: environmental impact is a function of 
population size, multiplied by the level of consumption, together with 
the nature of the technology being used.2 This equation provides the 
basis for the global scientific consensus concerning the ecological state 
of the world.   
But where are the contemporary ecophilosophers, environmental 
ethicists, and environmental historians in this new environmental 
reawakening—the social ecologists, ecofeminists, and Callicott with his 
Leopoldian ethic? Or have they actually been counterproductive to this 
reawakening? These contemporary ecophilosophers and environmental 
ethicists have generally paid little attention to the implications of the 
I=PAT equation, and to the world’s scientists’ increasingly dire 
warnings about the global ecological crisis. In addition, there has been a 
recent concerted effort by Deweyan neo-pragmatists (Bryan Norton, 
Bob Taylor, Ben Minteer, Andrew Light, Paul Thompson, and others) 
to take over the field of ecophilosophy in the pages of Environmental 
Ethics journal and elsewhere, even though Bob Taylor admits that 
Dewey was anthropocentric and promoted the exploitation of Nature.3 
At the same time, William Cronon, Carolyn Merchant, and a new cadre 
of anthropocentric leftist postmodern deconstructionists have taken over 
the field of environmental history from Donald Worster, Roderick 
Nash, and others who founded the discipline and were centrally 
concerned with the philosophical development of environmentalism and 
the worsening ecological crisis. Michael Zimmerman has drawn 
parallels between the neo-pragmatists and the postmodern theorists, 
with their overriding political preoccupation with human concerns such 
as social justice, democratic institutions, and fear of totalitarianism and 
fascism.4 But why call this ecophilosophy or environmental ethics? 
Concern with the global ecological crisis, and ecophilosophical 




cracks or have been deliberately discouraged. The most important 
philosophical/ecological controversies going on these days, such as 
critiques of anthropocentric and economic worldviews, and the 
cybernetic/technological replacement of the biosphere, are ruled out-of-
bounds. It’s as if these theorists have moved back in time, before there 
was any widespread awareness of global ecological crisis. 
David Nicholson-Lord, writing recently about the disappearance of the 
issue of overpopulation from public awareness and the agendas of 
environmental organizations, asks whether we shouldn’t be concerned 
that human population has more than doubled from three billion in 1960 
to six-and-a-half billion today and is projected to reach nine to ten 
billion by 2050? He points out that ecological footprint analysis shows 
that humans have now overshot the Earth’s carrying capacity by 40 per 
cent and this could grow to 130 per cent by 2050. The influence of 
Julian Simon’s “unlimited growth” perspective on both the political 
right and the left has heavily contributed to this lack of concern, and the 
public, and perhaps a new generation of academics, have been taken in 
by right-wing anti-ecological propaganda to the point where they have 
discounted the reality of global ecological crisis. But Nicholson-Lord 
also sees an overall return to anthropocentrism over the last several 
decades (“human society turning in on itself and losing contact with 
nature”) as a major cause of this lack of concern.5 This runs parallel 
with the ecologically conservative anthropocentric backlash of the neo-
pragmatists and postmodernists in the academic fields mentioned 
above. 
At the same time, the deep ecology movement which, since the 1960s 
and 70s, has been centrally concerned with the full dimensions of the 
global ecological crisis and with a shift away from anthropocentrism, 
has been relentlessly attacked by both the political right and the left. 
Fred Buell’s outstanding scholarly analysis of environmentalism, From 
Apocalypse to Way of Life, thoroughly documents the massive right-
wing Republican anti-environmental disinformation campaign 
beginning with Ronald Reagan and Julian Simon, which singled out 
deep ecology as the main culprit.6 One textbook author pointed out that 
“it sometimes seems that Deep Ecology acts as a lightning rod for 
environmental criticism and backlash. Because Deep Ecology does 
critique the dominant worldview, we should not be surprised to find 
significant critical reaction.”7 Attacks also continued in the 1980s from 
the academic left with Murray Bookchin and his social ecology, from 
ecofeminists, and more recently from the neo-pragmatists and 
postmodern theorists. Some of this amounted to legitimate academic 
“give and take” but a good deal of it has been the result of unusually 
careless scholarship and ideological blindness. And insofar as the 
Volume 22, Number 2 123
nature and severity of the global ecological crisis has been 
misrepresented and belittled in the process, this goes beyond “playing 
academic games.” Many of these academic theorists appear to have 
gone out of their way to remain ecologically illiterate.8 In what follows, 
I examine these critiques from the postmodern theorists, social 
ecologists, ecofeminists, and others, and try to reassess the position of 
the deep ecology movement as it developed from Rachel Carson and 
David Brower’s Sierra Club in the early 1960s, through Paul Ehrlich to 
Arne Naess in the 1970s, and on to the present.9
I. Postmodernists as the “New Creationists.” 
Scientists Barbara Ehrenreich and Janet McIntosh refer to postmodern 
theorists as the “New Creationists” who hold that biology is irrelevant 
to understanding humans.10 For instance, Stanford philosopher John 
Dupre claims that “it is ‘essentialist’ even to think that we are a 
biological species in the usual sense—that is, a group possessing any 
common tendencies or ‘universal properties’ that might shed some light 
on our behavior.” Clifford Gertz, an early proponent of social 
constructivism, is quoted as saying that “our ideas, our values, our acts, 
even our emotions are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products” 
having nothing to do with biological evolution. “Some of the strongest 
rejections of the biological,” Ehrenreich and McIntosh claim, “come 
from scholars with a left or feminist perspective . . .” With the 
postmodernists, this has hardened into dogma, much like the Biblical 
creationists, and intellectual dissent from this dogma is rudely 
discouraged. But, in their view, “in portraying human beings as pure 
products of cultural context, the secular creationist standpoint not only 
commits biological errors but defies common sense.” They conclude 
that “this climate of intolerance, often imposed by scholars of the left, 
ill suits an academic tradition rhetorically committed to human 
freedom. What’s worse, it provides intellectual backup for a political 
outlook that sees no real basis for common ground among humans of 
different sexes, races, and cultures.” 
The modern rift between the sciences and the humanities (and now the 
“hard sciences” and the humanities/social sciences) has a history that 
leads back at least to Descartes. In his development of an “ecology of 
man,” Paul Shepard in 1969 discussed the rift between the sciences and 
humanities, how the Left saw evolutionary theory as leading to Social 
Darwinism and eugenics, and how both the sciences (in their 
mechanistic phase) and the humanities have led to an alienated and 
Nature-hating culture.11 In his recent book on deep ecology (The 




postmodernism’s exorcism of Eurocentrism from anthropology. But, 
like Ehrenreich and McIntosh, he claims that the tide of postmodernist 
relativism is beginning to turn and a “universal cultural design” is 
receiving support from ethology, primatology, hominid paleontology, 
linguistics, and Paleolithic archaeology. For Bender, one of the keys to 
understanding the biological basis for human nature is Mary Midgley’s 
concept of “open instincts.” Based on this “universal design,” Bender 
endorses Shepard’s “Paleolithic counterrevolution” against modernity.12
Looking more deeply into the roots of the “New Creationism” 
Nature/Culture debate, Michael Zimmerman, in Contesting Earth’s 
Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, summarizes the rise of 
French postmodernist thinking. This began, he claims, after the failed 
European student revolution of 1968 when French intellectuals turned 
away from Marxism and utopianism. Given the Nazi holocaust, recently 
compounded by revelations of the Soviet Gulag, the main fears and 
concerns of the French postmodernists were political: protecting 
democracy, promoting social justice, and avoiding totalitarianism and 
fascism, even if this resulted in nihilism. French intellectuals turned for 
inspiration to the anti-humanistic critique of modernity developed by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss.13 
It is not surprising that, for all three of these thinkers, the rejection of 
humanistic modernism also went hand-in-hand with the rejection of 
anthropocentrism. Fred Bender argues that Nietzsche could be 
considered “the first philosopher of deep ecology” with his idea of 
“perfect nihilism” consisting of a joyful affirmation of “faithfulness to 
the Earth.”14 Heidegger criticized the anthropocentric humanism of 
modernity for its assault on the Earth. What is most striking to me is 
Levi-Strauss’s 1962 critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s humanistic 
existentialism. Sartre was the quintessential French anthropocentric 
Enlightenment humanist: promoting Eurocentric unlimited progress and 
rejecting science as it relates to humans because of its supposed strict 
cause and effect determinism, which he thought undermined the 
possibility of human freedom. Sartre has been labelled the “anti-Nature 
philosopher”; his goal, he claimed, was to “rescue the entire species 
from animality.” For Sartre, humans are totally free and unlimited 
(what Pete Gunter refers to as “man-infinite”). In contrast with his 
French existentialist colleague Albert Camus, Sartre was a biophobe.15 
Levi-Strauss claimed, according to Zimmerman, that “anthropocentric 
humanism has justified the extermination of thousands of species, each 
of which was as valuable as a human.” Sounding like John Muir’s 
critique of “Lord man,” Levi-Strauss asserted that his anti-humanism 
was not misanthropic, but a critique of the strutting arrogance of 
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modern humanity, a humanism which “makes man into the lord, into 
the absolute master of creation.” Levi-Strauss preferred the “humility of 
primal people,” claiming that “care about mankind without a 
simultaneous solidarity-like caring for all other forms of life . . . [leads] 
mankind to self-oppression and self-exploitation.” The French 
postmodernists (Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard), Zimmerman points 
out, “focused on human and social and cultural affairs, thus minimizing 
Levi-Strauss’s and Heidegger’s criticism of modernity’s assault on 
nature.”16 Several centuries earlier, their countryman Rousseau had 
argued that Europeans were becoming too civilized and needed to get 
back to Nature. But there is a direct lineage in French philosophy from 
the anti-Nature mind/body Christian dualism of Descartes through 
Sartre to Derrida. The postmodernists have rejected modernism as it 
relates to human society but, unlike the thinkers who inspired them 
(Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Levi-Strauss), they have failed to address 
the issue of anthropocentrism and modern humanity’s destruction of 
wild Nature. Thus, French postmodernists have continued a central part 
of the Enlightenment project by developing convoluted theory and 
linguistic theoretical constructs designed to showcase humanity’s 
uniqueness and superiority while, at the same time, casting doubt on the 
existence of Nature independent of human language and culture. For 
postmodernists, humans are not biologically a part of Nature.  
 
The Politicizing of Science and Ecocide 
Ehrenreich and McIntosh further point out that “postmodernist 
perspectives go beyond a critique of the misuses of biology to offer a 
critique of biology itself, extending to all of science and often to the 
very notion of rational thought itself.” As one of the strengths of 
postmodernist analysis they appreciate Foucault’s insight that power is 
everywhere, even in claims to truth. Thus, as a holdover from Marxist 
analysis, postmodernists claim (according to Zimmerman) that “what 
passes for objective truth is a construction generated by power-
interested elites.” To counter the power elite’s hegemonic grip on truth, 
postmodernists hold that “truth should result from negotiations in which 
as many voices as possible are heard.” Zimmerman suggests that even 
Arne Naess’s Ecosophy T is a power-motivated perspective, for it 
promotes his own striving for Self-realization, and his desire to be in 
wilderness areas.17 The postmodernist theory of truth presumably serves 
their democratic concerns while, at the same time, delegitimizing any 
biological understanding of humans, and basically undercutting the 
theoretical sciences as an on-going effort to be an objective (or 




exclusively from a political “power” perspective, then truth, like 
everything else, is to be “negotiated.”   
While Ehrenreich and McIntosh agree that “science needs close and 
ongoing scrutiny,” they side with evolutionist Stephan Jay Gould when 
he says that “some facts and theories are truly universal (and true)—and 
no variety of cultural traditions can change that . . . we can’t let a 
supposedly friendly left-wing source be exempt from criticism from 
anti-intellectual positions.” This, of course, goes counter to the 
postmodernist claim that all knowledge is socially constructed, and 
specifically challenges Donna Haraway’s view that knowledge should 
be solely “situated” and local. But there are legitimate forms of 
knowledge which are both universal and local. For example, the 
paleontologist Niles Eldredge points out that hunting-gathering people 
have an intimate knowledge of their local ecosystems. Their 
classification of plants and animals often coincides exactly with those 
developed by biologists. Eldridge concludes that “when we compare 
lists of plants and animals drawn up by local peoples with those of 
professional biologists, it confirms our notion that species are real 
entities in the natural world, not just figments of Western-world 
classificatory imaginations”: in other words, knowledge is not just 
culturally relative and reducible to “social constructions.”18  
The distinguished ethical theorist Bernard Williams also recently 
criticized both the postmodernists and the pragmatist Richard Rorty for 
denigrating and relativizing the concept of truth. Williams claims that 
the deconstructionists “depend on the remarkable assumption that the 
sociology of knowledge is in a better position to deliver truth about 
science than science is to deliver truth about the world.” Physical and 
biological scientists are also not especially pleased with the rather 
careless politicizing and subjective undermining of their fields.19 And 
so we have both the political left and the right politicizing science to 
serve their respective agendas. 
In a paper on social constructivism and deep ecology, Mick Smith 
claims that I hold that (1) “current scientific theory [is] an accurate and 
unchanging representation of the world as it really is … that it gives us 
privileged access to the truth,” (2) that by supporting genetic theory, I 
thereby support the technological applications of genetics, (3) that 
although I criticize anthropocentric humanism, I actually remain within 
the modernist Enlightenment humanist paradigm by supporting natural 
science as an attempt to provide a true description and understanding of 
Nature, and (4) that Paul Shepard and I are sociobiologists and 
biological determinists in holding that biology has a significant role to 
play in understanding human behaviour and human nature.20 Smith’s 
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claims seem to me to represent the typical postmodernist “straw man” 
arguments of the type discussed above. Having been trained as a 
philosopher of science, I am quite aware that science undergoes change. 
Smith seems to wilfully ignore my explicit claims about being a skeptic 
with regard to science ever arriving at final and complete Truth. I also 
make the customary distinction between theoretical science and its 
applications (applied science-technology); I support the former while 
having serious reservations about a good deal of the latter. With regard 
to (4), I essentially agree with the analysis presented by Ehrenreich and 
McIntosh, and with Fred Bender, as discussed above.   
Inspired by Spinoza’s account of the three levels of knowledge, Arne 
Naess (a major theoretical philosopher of science) makes a crucial 
distinction between the “contents of reality” and the “structure of 
reality.” Naess’s account of Gestalts as the rock-bottom “contents” of 
reality is his version of non-dualism. Theoretical science, on the other 
hand, provides us with an account of the structure of reality, and both 
the contents and structure of reality are independent of the relativizing 
of social construction. As a philosophical analysis of knowledge, I think 
Naess is on the right track here and this, of course, puts the lie to, and 
undercuts, the postmodernist sociological analysis of truth and 
knowledge.21   
Timed to coincide with the UN Rio Environmental conference, in 
February 1992 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Royal 
Society of London (acknowledging the essential correctness of the 
earlier analyses of Paul Ehrlich and other ecologists of the 1960s and 
70s) jointly announced that worldwide population growth of nearly 100 
million people annually was the “core reason” for the loss of forests, 
global warming, and the rate of species extinction. They claimed that 
“the future of the planet is in balance” and called for the rapid 
stabilization of the world’s population. Later that year, 1,575 of the 
world’s leading scientists from 69 countries, including 104 Nobel 
laureates, signed the 1992 World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity 
claimed that “Human beings and the natural world are on a collision 
course . . . We, the undersigned, senior members of the world’s 
scientific community, hereby warn all of humanity of what lies ahead. 
A great change . . . is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided 
and our global home on this planet is not to be irretrievably mutilated . . 
. No more than one or a few decades remain before the chance to avert 
the threats we now confront will be lost . . .” In 1993, fifty-eight of the 
National Academies of Sciences throughout the world came together to 
draft a similar statement. Lester Brown has recently discussed the 




occur since the Rio conference and the warnings of the world’s 
scientists.22
It is significant that Fred Bender begins The Culture of Extinction with 
a 40 page detailed scientific summary of the global ecological crisis: 
from overpopulation, global warming and ozone depletion, to 
biodiversity loss, habitat destruction and ecosystem collapse, toxic 
pollution, ocean degradation, arable land loss, fresh water shortages, 
and deforestation, the sum total of which he refers to as “ecocide.” 
Business as usual policies, such as sustainable development, might 
allow us to grow for a few more decades. By drawing on the 1990 
computer models of Donella Meadows and others, he claims the 
evidence now strongly suggests “that overshoot and collapse will occur 
during the present century” unless major social change rapidly occurs 
(ecological footprint analysis now indicates that overshoot actually 
began in the 1970s). A parallel analysis, focusing specifically on 
species extinction and habitat loss, has been given by University of 
Hawaii researcher Franz Broswimmer in his book Ecocide. Current 
estimates are that 30,000 species are going extinct each year, up from 
1000 species per year in the 1970s, in what scientists call the Sixth 
Mass Species Extinction Event. The analysis of the global ecological 
crisis provided by Bender and Broswimmer reflects the overall 
consensus of the world’s scientific organizations.23 Arne Naess, like 
Bender, has looked at several scenarios for the twenty-first century 
leading to ecosystem collapse which would, in Naess’s view, result in 
harsh totalitarian measures by governments to restore order. Naess 
hopes for a more rational deep ecological approach to avoid both 
ecospheric collapse and totalitarian measures.24 In attempting to 
undermine the impartiality and “objectivity” of the natural and 
biological sciences, the postmodern social constructivist position 
undermines the credibility of the world scientist’s warnings about the 
ecological state of the world. 
A refusal to accept the global scientific ecological consensus, of course, 
changes the whole picture in terms of social priorities and the need for 
radical worldview and social change. The political right has argued for 
decades against the scientific consensus in the person of Julian Simon 
and his followers who have claimed that there is no human 
overpopulation problem or global ecological crisis. In 1995 a book 
appeared by the environmental journalist Greg Easterbook which 
argued that the environment is in better shape than it has ever been. 
Easterbrook was partly influenced by the New Age views of Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin.25 More recently, the left has had its champion 
ecological dissenter in the young Danish statistician Bjorn Lomborg 
who, inspired by Julian Simon, has challenged all the figures on 
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deforestation, species loss, rates of population growth, global warming, 
and so on. Lomborg says he is a “left-wing guy” who wants to free up 
all the money needlessly spent on ecological protection to promote 
Third World development and feeding the poor. As the situation has 
evolved, the irresponsible views of both Simon and Lomborg have 
turned into a world-wide scandal. Ehrlich and Diamond show that 
Simon is ecologically illiterate. In the case of Lomborg, the scientific 
establishment, led by Peter Raven and others of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, rushed in to refute him in 
the pages of Scientific American and elsewhere. More recently, a panel 
of scientists (the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty) reviewed 
Lomborg’s book and decided that it is academically dishonest. They 
charitably concluded, however, that Lomborg basically got in over his 
head and didn’t fully understand the nature of the issue involved.26 In 
critiquing the views of Simon and Lomborg, was this merely another 
Foucaultian power play on the part of the scientists (as Zimmerman and 
the postmodernist social constructivists would have it), or rather an 
attempt by the scientists to set the facts straight in the best long-term 
interests of humanity and the Earth? 
 
World Religions versus the New Creationism 
As we have seen, the new generation of postmodernist environmental 
historians and neo-pragmatist “ecophilosophers” have become 
increasing conservative and reactionary in terms of evolutionary 
science and the global scientific ecological consensus, and have 
effectively crawled back into the traditional Western “anthropocentric 
cocoon.” As philosopher Roderick French pointed out with regard to 
the traditional Western anthropocentric approach, “it is very unsettling  
. . . to consider the idea that the formation of human consciousness 
through training in literature, philosophy, history, religion and related 
disciplines may in fact inculcate values and behaviors that jeopardize 
the continuation of life itself.”27
Christian theologians have a history of blowing hot and cold on the 
ecological crisis, but beginning in the 1980s, under the prodding of the 
ecologically radical Catholic theologian Thomas Berry, together with 
Mary Tucker of Harvard University’s “Religions of the World and 
Ecology” program (who was influenced by Berry), significant progress 
has been made in alerting and radicalizing the world’s religious leaders 
to the catastrophic nature of the global ecological crisis and to the 




In 1997 the Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church, Bartholomew I, 
made the following pronouncement: 
To commit a crime against the natural world is a sin . . . For humans to cause 
species to become extinct and to destroy the biological diversity of God’s creation 
. . . for humans to degrade the integrity of [the] Earth by causing changes in its 
climate, stripping the Earth of its natural forests or destroying its wetlands . . . for 
humans to contaminate the Earth’s waters, its land, its air and its life with 
poisonous substances, these are sins.  
The Pope had earlier shocked the world with his pronouncement 
concerning the overwhelming evidence in support of Darwinian 
evolution. In June 2002, Bartholomew and the Pope issued a “Common 
Declaration” on the environment declaring “our hope that [God’s 
design] will be realized through our cooperation in restoring its original 
harmony.”29
Religions in rich and poor countries alike are beginning to take a 
leadership role in addressing both the global and local dimensions of 
the ecological crisis. For many years, the Dalai Lama has been an 
outspoken advocate for ecological responsibility and for protecting the 
ecosystems and wildlife of Tibet. The Buddhist monk Sulak Sivaraksa 
is a leader of the Assembly of the Poor which combines a social justice 
and ecological approach to protecting the forests and wildlife (and the 
home of indigenous people) in Thailand. Sivaraksa, Thich Nhat Hanh, 
Gary Snyder, and the American Buddhist/deep ecologist Joanna Macy 
have been mentioned as being instrumental in moving world-wide 
Buddhism into a new third phase of social and ecological activism. 
Further, the Brazilian Christian theologian Leonardo Boff has written 
that, since the late 1960s, liberation theology has moved progressively 
from a concern for the starving poor, blacks and Indians, and the 
oppression of women, to a new concern for an ecological theology and 
spiritual ecology that focuses on the destruction of wild ecosystems and 
species on the basis of their “autonomy” and “intrinsic value.” Boff 
claims that “according to this theology, social injustice becomes 
ecological injustice” in that humans and society are “part and parcel of 
Nature.”30  
The conflict between the free-market capitalist, unlimited-growth 
economic-worldview versus an ecological worldview was sharply 
highlighted in 1995 when Thomas Berry made the dramatic claim that 
“we are already on the verge of total [ecological] dysfunctioning of the 
planet . . . [this] requires a drastic reduction in the plundering processes 
of the commercial industrial economy [and] a sudden and total change 
in lifestyle.” This is in sharp contrast with New York pundit Thomas 
Friedman and his uncritical cheerleading for economic globalization 
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(The World is Flat) in which American super consumerist lifestyles are 
spreading to China, India, and the furthest corners of the globe; the rich 
get richer while the poor get poorer; and multinational corporations 
increasingly rule the world. Writing in The Guardian last year, George 
Monbiot claimed that modern economics sees the cure to all the world’s 
ills as endless growth, whereas global warming “exposes our 
economists as utopian fantasists . . .” At the 2004 Parliament of World 
Religions held in Spain, where there was an emphasis on spirituality 
and ecology, Rabbi Michael Lerner received the most applause for his 
critique of globalization as a “soulless religion of the Market”—a 
comprehensive worldview that “acts like a proselytizing religion, 
promising salvation through consumerism, technological gadgets, and 
economic power.”31
The most radical religious/ecological statement to appear recently is the 
“God’s Earth Is Sacred” document of the World Council of Churches 
(available on their website). It rejects “business as usual” and calls for 
drastic reductions in economic production and consumption, along with 
protection of ecosystems and species. Dealing with the global 
ecological crisis is “the central moral imperative of our time.” But the 
most glaring omission in all this radical religious ecological awakening, 
from Thomas Berry to the World Council of Churches, is the lack of 
any reference to human overpopulation! They have accepted and 
promoted most the global scientific ecological consensus except one of 
its most crucial aspects. They need to study Diamond’s Collapse and 
Ehrlich’s One with Nineveh and present the world with a 
comprehensive ecological analysis and critique. 
While the world’s religious leaders are now taking ecologically radical 
positions, and lining up with the world-wide scientific community and 
the position of the deep ecology movement, the Republican, right-wing, 
George W. Bush “Wise Use movement” White House is in collusion 
with the apocalyptic fundamentalist Christians who see ecological 
collapse as “good news.” The journalist Glenn Scherer provides an 
outstanding analysis of the anti-ecological “end-time” Christian 
apocalyptics and how they have politically taken control of Congress. 
This message was repeated by veteran journalist Bill Moyers when he 
received the Harvard Medical School’s Global Environment Citizen 
award in 2004.32
How ironic that highly educated academics such as the leftist 
postmodern deconstructionists would end up as “new creationists” 
taking scientific and ecological positions similar to the anti-ecological 
Biblical creationist Christian right! And now some theologians (who 




ecological movement, while supposedly open-minded philosophers 
(such as the neo-pragmatists) have dropped back to being minimally 
ecologically concerned anthropocentrists. The ecophilosopher Jack 
Turner (in The Abstract Wild) comes close to expressing my feelings 
when he says that despite his training in the Western philosophical 
tradition “I am suspicious of that tradition, its means and ends, yet I 
remain its servant.”33 Given the present reactionary position of most of 
contemporary Western philosophy (including the new generation of 
“ecophilosophers”) which can’t seem to rise above its anthropocentric 
biophobic past, I am beginning to feel more solidarity with the radical 
ecological theologians of the world.  
 
II. From Guha to Cronon: The Postmodern 
Deconstruction of Wilderness 
The most recent phase of wilderness critiques began in 1989 with the 
Indian social ecologist Ramachandra Guha who, in a very influential 
paper, took on the mantle of spokesman for the Third World by 
providing a “Third World critique.”34 Calling himself a “sympathetic 
outsider,” Guha claimed that the deep ecology movement is just a 
radical trend within the American wilderness preservation movement. It 
has little relevance to the real environmental issues facing humanity-
social justice, over-consumption by the rich, and militarization (Guha 
considers these “the major dangers to the integrity of the natural 
world”). He even goes so far as to suggest that “a truly radical ecology 
movement in the American context ought to work toward a synthesis of 
the appropriate technology, alternate lifestyle, and peace movements.” 
Guha refers to India euphemistically as a “densely populated country.” 
By any realistic ecological measure India is grossly overpopulated and 
has now shot past China as the most populated country in the world. 
One is astounded to see the environmental crisis characterized in this 
way, given the global scientific ecological consensus. 
Guha is upset with the nature reserves established to protect tigers and 
other endangered species in India in the 1970s by prime minister Indira 
Gandhi, in collaboration with international conservation organizations. 
He rejects the view “that intervention in nature should be guided 
primarily by the need to preserve biotic integrity rather than by the 
needs of humans.” In his view, India’s tiger reserves (which also protect 
many other endangered species) are an example of “elite ecological 
imperialism” that results in “a direct transfer of resources from the poor 
to the rich.” Guha further asserts that American parks and wilderness 
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areas (as in the Third World) cater primarily to the rich as tourist 
attractions. “Deep ecology,” he claims, “runs parallel to the consumer 
society without seriously questioning its ecological and socio-political 
basis.” The ecological issues, for Guha, are primarily issues of human 
social justice. Further, the deep ecology anthropocentric-biocentric 
distinction is “largely spurious.” He is upset by deep ecological appeals 
to Eastern traditions such as Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism as a 
basis for its ecocentrism, claiming this is politically motivated to 
provide an “authentic lineage,” and to present itself as a universal 
philosophy (as opposed to a parochial American one). 
Guha cites the Devall-Sessions Deep Ecology book, but even with its 
faults, it contained enough information to head off most of his 
misconceptions about deep ecology. If he had read the book more 
carefully, he would have found that the deep ecology movement is not 
narrowly focused on wilderness. For instance, bioregionalism is 
highlighted in the book as an ecologically sensible way of life for 
people throughout the world. There is a critique of inappropriate 
technology. Guha also would have found criticism of over-consumption 
by the rich. He dismisses the appeal to Eastern religions as a “political 
ploy” apparently without realizing, for example, that Arne Naess is a 
recognized world authority on Gandhi’s philosophy and has 
incorporated Gandhi into his personal ecological philosophy (Ecosophy 
T). Further, Gary Snyder trained for ten years as a Zen priest in Japan, 
and bases his deep ecology philosophy and practice on Zen.35 In short, 
Guha’s knowledge of the deep ecology movement appears to be greatly 
distorted. And Guha is not the “impartial” or representative Third 
World spokesperson that many took him to be. There are many people 
throughout the Third World who place a high priority on efforts to 
protect biodiversity and wild Nature in their countries. Further, he is not 
necessarily a representative spokesperson even for India. For example, 
the well-known Indian physicist/ecofeminist, Vandana Shiva, claims 
that deep ecology’s insistence on the intrinsic value and protection of 
wild species and habitat is the only way to ensure a healthy life-style for 
the world’s poor in the long run.36 Despite these problems, Guha 
nevertheless touched a nerve: the issue of displacing indigenous people 
from their homes in order to set up preserves to protect wild 
ecosystems, endangered species, and the continuing evolutionary flow 
of wild Nature. 
A much more systematic and comprehensive critique of the wilderness 
concept was developed beginning in 1991 by J. Baird Callicott, one of 
the leading expositors of Leopold’s land ethic. Summarizing Callicott’s 
position, he first of all claims that the original rationale for protecting 




values. But, this is misleading. Muir also rejected the anthropocentrism 
of what he called “Lord Man”: for Muir, wild nonhuman beings have a 
right to exist for their own sakes and this requires protecting large 
expanses of wilderness as wild habitat. Thoreau was the first modern 
thinker to emphasize the crucial importance of protecting the Earth’s 
wildness; Muir agreed with Thoreau and emphasized the role of 
anthropocentrism in destroying wildness.37 Second, according to 
Callicott, wilderness preservation is a defensive and ultimately losing 
strategy. Third, echoing Guha, Callicott argues that wilderness is a 
uniquely American concept and is not exportable. It results in evicting 
indigenous people from their homes in the remaining wild areas of the 
Third World. Fourth, it is an ethnocentric concept. No wilderness is 
pristine (untouched by human hands): native people managed and, in 
some cases, altered the landscape with fire and other means. Fifth, 
recent ecological theory claims that ecosystems are constantly changing 
and unstable, whereas Callicott claims that wilderness preservation 
assumes a stable ecosystem. And sixth, by excluding permanent human 
habitation, the wilderness concept reinforces a philosophical and literal 
separation of humans from nature.  
Unlike Guha and his exclusively social justice-oriented colleagues, 
Callicott has a thorough knowledge of the ecological literature, and 
realizes the necessity of ecosystem and species protection. He proposes 
replacing the concept of legally designated wilderness with the concept 
of “biodiversity reserves” to protect biodiversity and ecological habitat. 
But in their anthology, The Great New Wilderness Debate, Callicott and 
Michael Nelson insist that these “biodiversity reserves” must be 
managed. What do Callicott and Nelson have against unmanaged 
wildness? Do they feel the need to “control Nature” by managing it? 
Perhaps the most insightful exchange occurred between Callicott, the 
conservation biologist Reed Noss, and Dave Foreman. Noss and 
Foreman seem to successfully answer most of Callicott’s points.38
In addition to his biodiversity reserve alternative, Callicott also 
endorses the concept of “sustainable development.” The biologist 
Edward Grumbine has argued against Callicott’s sustainable 
development proposal. Sustainable development involves too much 
management and development, and goes hand-in-hand with Callicott’s 
vision of a “global technological society.” Grumbine claims that, for 
Callicott, there is “very little of the sense of limits” that will be required 
for future ecologically compatible societies.39 Callicott seems oblivious 
to the vast literature criticizing sustainable development. And like the 
reform environmental organization leaders of the 1980s, Callicott seems 
to have backed away from the “limits to growth” analysis, while 
promoting instead what Fred Buell refers to as the much less radical 
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“ecological modernization” position. Arne Naess, on the other hand, 
has proposed that we substitute the concept of “ecological 
sustainability” for the ecologically flawed concept of sustainable 
development.40 
Postmodern social constructivism dramatically entered the debate with 
environmental historian William Cronon’s paper, “The Trouble with 
Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.”41 Excerpts 
appeared in the New York Times Magazine and other newspapers in 
1995 with such titles as “Inventing the Wilderness” and “Is Wilderness 
a Threat to Environmentalism?” In 1990, the leading environmental 
historian, Donald Worster, had engaged in a debate with the new 
postmodern environmental historians. Worster claimed that Cronon and 
Carolyn Merchant attempt to “reduce environmental history to social 
history and to embrace the latter’s causal arguments and moral 
concerns—the importance of gender, race, class, and so forth.” Cronon 
had so broadly redefined environment as cultural landscape that it 
would “encompass virtually every place on earth, even hospitals and 
military bases.”42
Cronon’s paper draws on the arguments of Guha and Callicott, but adds 
the postmodernist theme that Nature and wilderness are social 
constructs that need to be “reinvented.” Cronon’s style of presentation 
seems unusually ambiguous and devious, and much of the cogency of 
his argument rests on this. For example, Cronon claims that “wilderness 
poses a serious threat to responsible environmentalism in the late 
twentieth century.” But is he talking about the concept of wilderness or 
the physical landscape to which the word “wilderness” refers? As it 
turns out, it’s both. For Cronon, the Euro-American idea of wilderness 
is Romantic and based on historical factual inaccuracies such as the 
extent to which the Earth’s surface has been altered from its “pristine” 
state by native peoples. In line with Callicott, he claims that his 
criticism “is not directed at wild nature, or even at efforts to set aside 
large tracts of wild land.” But this is misleading, for Cronon ultimately 
sides with Guha. The “bottom line” for Cronon is that “responsible 
environmentalism” needs to be redirected away from protecting large 
wild areas world-wide (for wild species and biodiversity protection) 
toward a concern for our “backyards”: places like cities and other areas 
where we “live, work, and play.”  
Cronon’s grasp of ecological science seems somewhat slender: for 
instance, he claims that the genetically domesticated tree growing in our 
backyard is just as wild and “other” as a tree growing in an old growth 
forest. In a valuable ecological critique of Cronon, conservation 




explains how conservation biologists understand and classify wild 
ecosystems.43 In another example of scientific confusion, David Kidner 
(in his excellent critique of social constructivism) faults Cronon for 
suggesting that many of the most dramatic global ecological problems 
(global warming, ozone depletion, biodiversity loss) “exist mainly as 
simulated representations in complex computer models of natural 
systems.”44 Is Cronon proposing that scientists are manufacturing or 
“constructing” the world’s global ecological problems, thereby 
belittling these problems so that emphasis can be placed on local urban 
pollution and environmental social justice issues?  
Any doubts about the direction Cronon and his postmodernist 
colleagues are headed should be dispelled by the orientation of the 
participants, and the issues discussed, at the “Reinventing Nature” 
conference (inspired by his paper and organized by Cronon) held at the 
University of California in Irvine in 1994. The title of the conference 
came from the work of Donna Haraway of “Cyborg Manifesto” fame, 
who was a participant. For example, Richard White discussed the fight 
for the protection of the ancient forests of the Pacific Northwest in 
terms of those who work (the loggers) versus recreationists, while 
downplaying the ecological issues. Candice Slater and Carolyn 
Merchant accused environmentalists of trying to return to a lost Eden of 
pristine wild Nature. Giovanna DiChiro promoted the conflating of 
environmentalism with social justice. Katherine Hayles discussed the 
convergence of virtual reality with experiences arising from the natural 
world. It is significant that the ecologist Daniel Botkin was invited to 
Cronon’s conference, although he could not attend. Botkin also 
apparently rejects “limits to growth” and the global ecological scientific 
consensus. Donald Worster has criticized Botkin for wanting to develop 
almost all of the Earth to the point where it has been made “a 
comfortable home” for civilization. “Nature in the twenty-first 
century,” Botkin claims, “will be a nature that we make.” But what then 
happens to the wild ecosystems and species which make up the Earth’s 
life support system?45
The participants took field trips to Disneyland, Sea World, and the 
South Coast Plaza shopping mall with its Nature Company to see how 
the corporate world “reinvents” Nature. If there are any future 
conferences on “reinventing Nature,” a more appropriate field trip 
would be to the American Museum of Natural History in New York 
City to see how biologists “invent” Nature. Niles Eldredge, the curator 
of the Hall of Biodiversity, opened a major exhibit in 1998 called Life 
in the Balance. It explains ecosystem functioning, the values of 
biodiversity, the nature of human dependence on wild ecosystems, and 
what can be done to avert the Sixth Mass Species Extinction Event. In 
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the book accompanying the exhibit, Eldredge’s impassioned plea for 
protecting biodiversity and species habitat is, in itself, a profound 
refutation of postmodern deconstruction. Eldredge claims that “because 
we are still stuck with the notion that we have escaped the natural 
world, few of us see the dependence that our species truly has on the 
health of the global system.” If they can’t make it to the exhibit, Botkin 
and all the participants at the “Reinventing Nature” conference owe it to 
themselves to read Eldredge’s little book!46 
Gary Snyder has little patience with Cronon and the postmodernists. He 
points out that early ecologists understood that ecosystems were in flux 
and change. Many pre-agricultural societies made relatively minimal 
impact on the environment so, in many cases, these lands should be 
referred to as “virtually pristine” rather than “pristine.”47 Snyder claims 
that the positions of Cronon and Botkin are “simply the high end of the 
“wise use” movement.” Cronon and the postmodernists fail to realize 
that “wilderness is the locus of big rich ecosystems, and is thus (among 
other things) a living place for beings who can survive in no other sort 
of habitat.”48  
David Orr (whose sound judgment on environmental matters over the 
years rivals that of Snyder, Arne Naess, and Donald Worster) provides 
an excellent summary and evaluation of what he calls “the Not-So-
Great Wilderness Debate.” The key assumption—that Nature can be 
reinvented—“works only if one first conceives it as an ephemeral social 
construction. If Nature is so unhitched from its moorings in hard 
physical realities, it can be re-cast as anything one fancies.” Cronon’s 
claim that we should redirect our attention to the “wildness” in our own 
backyards is a “small idea” when we must “cope with global problems 
of species extinction, climatic change, emerging diseases, and the 
breakdown of entire ecosystems.” Orr refers to historian Peter Coates’ 
claim that “reckless deconstructionism cuts the ground from under the 
argument for the preservation of endangered species.” Like Snyder, Orr 
sees postmodern views as similar to views found “only on the extreme 
political right.” He concludes that “postmodernism provides no realistic 
foundation for a workable or intellectually robust environmentalism.”49  
The “wilderness debate” from Guha to Cronon is merely a small part of 
much larger leftist “culture wars” and intellectual social/political 
conflicts. One also needs to look, for example, at urban planner Robert 
Gottlieb’s book, Forcing the Spring. Mark Dowie rightly regards it as a 
“landmark revisionist history of environmentalism” which stresses 
urban pollution and human environmental justice issues as the essence 
of environmentalism. Gottlieb’s research is shallow, however, when he 




protecting wilderness primarily for scenic and recreational purposes. He 
also portrays the biologist Rachel Carson as being concerned primarily 
with pesticide pollution and “quality of life” issues, while ignoring her 
broader ecological and anti-anthropocentric stance. Gottlieb points out 
that the New Left (inspired by Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse, and 
Murrry Bookchin in the 1960s) was proposing an urban and social post-
scarcity environmentalism focusing on pollution, new technologies, and 
the problem of over-consumption (much as Guha now does). The 
purpose of Gottlieb’s book is to build a case for the resurrection of New 
Left urban environmentalism.50
Dowie expands on Gottlieb’s analysis and program for a “new urban 
environmentalism.” He brands the old wilderness conservationists with 
the usual leftist rhetorical epithets as “racists” and “elitists” (a few of 
them were but most were not) and endorses the “shift in emphasis from 
the natural to the urban domain [that] has transformed American 
environmentalism . . . The central concern of the new movement is 
human health. Its adherents consider wilderness preservation a . . . 
worthy but overemphasized value.”51 Dowie does a good job of 
detailing all the foibles of the environmental movement and 
organizations as they became increasingly disorganized, ineffective, 
and confused about their priorities in the 1980s and ’90s under the 
onslaught of the Republican right and demands from the left to adopt its 
urban social justice agenda as primary. But Dowie’s minimal grasp of 
ecological realities and the scientific ecological consensus results in his 
elevating social justice issues above ecological issues. Like most 
urban/social justice environmental theorists who have come out of the 
traditions of the political Left, Gottlieb and Dowie seem to be 
ideologically blinded to the details of the history and biological basis of 
the conservation/ecology movement as it developed with Rachael 
Carson’s writings and David Brower’s leadership of the Sierra Club 
during the 1960s. Gottlieb references the key histories of this movement 
(Stephen Fox’s John Muir and his Legacy, and Michael Cohen’s The 
History of the Sierra Club) in his book, but the biological/ecological 
message didn’t seem to sink in. For the Left (including the postmodern 
deconstructionists) everything is viewed anthropocentrically in terms of 
“race, class, and gender.” For Gottlieb and Dowie, the early 
conservationist/ecologists were all “racists” and “elitists.” And now we 
have Carolyn Merchant (a leading postmodern/ecofeminist 
environmental historian) ignoring John Muir’s extraordinary ecological 
insights and achievements, and claiming he was a racist.52 
The New Left/social justice version of environmentalism (harkening 
back to Bookchin and Marcuse and now being resurrected by Gottlieb, 
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Dowie, Guha, and Cronon and the postmodernists) should, in the final 
analysis, be contrasted with these observations by Gary Snyder: 
Deep ecology thinkers insist that the natural world has value in its own right, that 
the health of natural systems should be our first concern, and that this best serves 
the interests of humans as well . . . It is proper that the range of the movement 
should run from wildlife to urban health. But there can be no health for humans 
and cities that bypasses the rest of nature. A properly radical environmentalist 
position is in no way anti-human. We grasp the pain of the human condition in its 
full complexity, and add the awareness of how desperately endangered certain key 
species and habitats have become.53
 
III. Bookchin, Social Ecology, and Nature/Culture 
Dualism 
Foucault was mostly right—power is almost everywhere, and certainly 
in the leftist (and postmodernist) orientations, which see everything as 
power politics. As Fred Bender (a former Marxist scholar) has pointed 
out, beginning with Marx, the left has rejected religion, including the 
religious spiritual traditions which provide an understanding of reality 
that involves techniques for moderating the domination of the ego. And 
now, reason and impartial evidence (the search for truth) is rejected by 
postmodernists in favour of (often inflammatory) rhetoric. This was 
nowhere more evident than in Murray Bookchin’s vitriolic political 
power-play when he took the podium in July of 1987 to denounce deep 
ecology (and promote social ecology) at the first U.S. Green meeting in 
Amherst, Massachusetts.54 Deep ecology had been promoted as the 
basic philosophy for the Greens by Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak 
in their book, Green Politics.55 Bookchin’s tirade involved the claim 
that deep ecology is a “black hole”—a “bottomless pit in which vague 
notions and moods of all kinds can be sucked into the depths of an 
ideological toxic dump.” Deep ecology is misanthropic in seeing 
humanity as an “ugly” anthropocentric thing that is “overpopulating the 
planet, devouring its resources, destroying its wildlife and the 
biosphere” (at least Bookchin got the last part of that statement right—
does he disagree?). Coupled with his violent rhetoric, Bookchin pushed 
all the right rhetorical buttons, with various accusations that were to 
become the stock-in-trade of leftist critics of deep ecology: for example, 
linking Dave Foreman’s Earth First! pronouncements (and Michael 
Zimmerman’s promotion of Heidegger’s philosophy as a basis for the 




The controversy appeared in the pages of The Nation. Kirkpatrick Sale 
saw a “concerted campaign afoot” when he served on a panel at the 
Socialist Scholars Conference earlier in 1987 with Bookchin and his 
colleague, Ynestra King, who attacked deep ecology and 
bioregionalism.56 King also claimed at a major Ecofeminist conference 
at the University of Southern California in 1987 that “there is only one 
ecology, and that is social ecology.” Alston Chase points out that Sale 
had been repeatedly interrupted while giving a talk on deep 
ecology/bioregionalism at an earlier UCLA conference (“International 
Green Movements and the Prospects for a New 
Environmental/Industrial Politics in the U.S.”) co-sponsored by Forcing 
the Spring author, Robert Gottlieb.57 Chase, who is politically right-
wing and also a critic of deep ecology, claims that Gottlieb (and 
Bookchin) were trying to extend the New Left German Green Party 
model to the United States: “environmentalism had not replaced 
Marxism but had been co-opted by it.” Sale concluded that Bookchin, 
King and the others were “actually out to destroy the influence” of the 
deep ecology movement. 
Fred Bender has little sympathy with social ecology, calling it “human 
chauvinism of the Left.” He asserts that “social ecology and 
ecofeminism continue to develop traditional concerns of the historic 
Left, particularly analysis of, and opposition to, the class and gender 
domination, and unjustified inequalities, embedded in the Culture of 
Extinction.”58 In her survey of Marxist, ecosocialist, and New Left 
political approaches to the environment, Australian political scientist 
Robyn Eckersley points out that Marx, like Locke and other classical 
liberals, “regarded the nonhuman world as no more than the ground of 
human activity, acquiring value if and when it became transformed by 
human labor or its extension—technology.” The entire leftist tradition 
has not deviated substantially from the original Marxist position in this 
regard. Eckersley proposes two “litmus” tests for an adequate 
ecological position: a concern for overpopulation and the protection of 
wilderness (conceived of as wild species habitat). Both Bookchin’s 
social ecology and ecofeminist positions fail dramatically on both 
scores.59  
As an intellectual leader of the New Left, Bookchin was hostile to the 
ecological perspective beginning with William Vogt and continuing 
with Paul Ehrlich (the dreaded “Neo-Malthusians”) that warned of 
overpopulation, over-consumption, and wilderness/species habitat loss, 
and promoted limits to growth and human expansion. In Robert 
Gottlieb’s view, “the environmental issue for Bookchin was pre-
eminently an urban issue.”60 Bookchin proposed a “post-scarcity 
anarchism” in which resources and human production are apparently 
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limitless (thus there is no overpopulation problem). The ecologist David 
Ehrenfeld quotes Bookchin as saying “for the first time in history, 
technology has reached an open end. The potential for technological 
development . . . is virtually unlimited.” Ehrenfeld chides Bookchin’s 
“boundless optimism” and asks why he embraces “the unwarranted 
optimism of a humanistic cult whose efforts to redesign the world in 
our own image have given us a lengthy string of ever-worsening 
failures?” Fred Buell points out the irony of how Julian Simon 
appropriated Bookchin’s leftist post-scarcity ideas and turned them into 
an argument for “right-wing liberated free enterprise” unlimited 
growth!61
In a 1988 article on the new ecophilosophies, there is a picture of 
Bookchin conferring with Marxist ecologist Barry Commoner at the 
1987 Socialist Scholars Conference. Chris Lewis pointed out that as late 
as 1990 (in his book Making Peace with the Planet) Commoner  
refuses to accept calls for controlling population growth, ending economic growth 
and development, and transforming the modern world. He argues that because 
humanity lives in two worlds, the natural world or ecosphere and a social world of 
its own creation—the technosphere [Nature/Culture]—the environmental crisis is 
not an ecological problem but a social and political problem.62
The Commoner-Ehrlich debates of the 1970s must now be viewed in a 
new light: Ehrlich representing the scientific/ ecological, ecocentric 
wing of the environmental movement (what was to become the global 
ecological scientific consensus based on the I=PAT equation) and 
Commoner essentially representing the anthropocentric urban pollution 
political agenda of the New Left. The essential correctness of Ehrlich’s 
analysis and efforts were acknowledged by the scientific community 
when they recently awarded him the first AAAS/Scientific American 
Prize for Science in the Service of Humanity.  
In 1989, Eckersley provided a critique of Bookchin’s ecological 
philosophy, focusing on his teleological interpretation of evolution as 
leading to greater diversity, complexity, and freedom, with humans at 
the top of the evolutionary ladder. For Bookchin, humans have created 
a “second nature” that has evolved from “first nature”—the old 
Nature/Culture dualism again. For Bookchin, it is necessary for humans 
to incorporate Nature into Culture thus adding “the dimension of 
freedom, reason, and ethics to first nature” in a new dialectical 
synthesis he calls “free Nature.” Marx had divided Nature and Culture 
into the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, and Bookchin’s 
distinction between first and second nature obviously reflects this. In 
comparing Bookchin to the French Jesuit priest Pierre Teilhard de 




bioengineer wild “first nature” and “seize the helm of evolution on the 
grounds that we have grasped the direction of evolution and are now 
ready and able to give it a helping hand.”63 Leaving wild nature and 
wild species alone “to follow their own evolutionary destinies” (in Gary 
Snyder’s words) would mean, for Bookchin, that humans were being 
“too passive.” 
Bookchin claims that he is in the tradition of Aristotle, Hegel, and 
Marx. At the beginning of the rise of ecophilosophy in 1974, the 
Australian philosopher and historian, John Passmore, put his finger on 
precisely what is wrong ecologically with the entire Aristotelian, 
Hegelian/Marxist tradition.64 For Aristotle, “nature is at its best when it 
fulfills men’s needs—that this, indeed, is its reason for existing . . .” 
This tradition continued, according to Passmore, with the German 
idealist metaphysics of Fichte and Hegel, and was incorporated into the 
thinking of Marx, Marcuse (and Bookchin) of the New Left, and 
Teilhard de Chardin. Marcuse followed the thinking of Fichte in 
claiming that there are “two kinds of human mastery: a repressive and a 
liberating one . . . As [man] civilizes nature, he at the same time 
liberates it, frees it, as Hegel also suggests, from its ‘negativity,’ its 
hostility to spirit.” Nonhuman nature must be humanized and 
spiritualized. There was no love lost for Nature in Hegel’s Christianized 
dialectical philosophy. As the modern philosophical basis for 
Culture/Nature dualism, Bender claims that Hegel held that Nature has 
no intrinsic value. He quotes Hegel as saying that humans should “wear 
her out . . . and annihilate her.” Hegel also asserted that “Man in so far 
as he is Spirit is not the creature of Nature.”65  
Bender argues that Nature/Culture is ultimately a bogus distinction and 
has no support from biology or the other sciences; contemporary human 
cultures still remain thoroughly imbedded in wild Nature and natural 
processes. His critique of Bookchin’s social ecology follows along the 
lines developed by Eckersley. He claims that “social ecology’s 
nebulous notion of ‘free’ nature amounts to nothing less than total 
planetary management, in support of massive, paternalistic intervention 
in evolution itself.” But the situation with Bookchin is even more 
disastrous and sweeping than that. After attempting to establish that 
humans, through their Culture, have exited Nature—evolved out of 
Nature into the entirely separate realm of Culture—Bookchin would 
have humans turn back and absorb all of Nature into Culture. “Free 
nature” is the form that Culture takes after it has engulfed wild Nature. 
Now it’s all Culture! The Hegelian tradition is so thoroughly 
anthropocentric, Nature-hating, and (in the case of Hegel) other-worldly 
that it is difficult to see how an adequate ecophilosophical position 
could ever be derived from it. Also, the dialectic is often used to imply 
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the inevitability of progress which, in many instances, is highly 
questionable. 
Thomas Berry has tried to work through the immense anti-ecological 
implications of the dominant Western philosophical and religious 
tradition’s approach to nonhuman wild Nature. As a Teilhardian 
scholar, Berry has attempted to reinterpret Teilhard ecocentrically. 
Contrary to both Teilhard and Bookchin, he claims that “the 
evolutionary process finds its highest expression in the earth 
community seen in its comprehensive dimensions, not simply in a 
human community reigning in triumphal dominion over the other 
components of the earth community.” The spontaneous course of 
evolution and wild Nature must be respected and protected.66  
John Clark is now social ecology’s “ablest philosopher,” according to 
Bender. Clark holds that social ecology’s distinctive claim is that “the 
human urge to dominate nature . . . results above all from human 
domination of other humans.”67 Warwick Fox has argued against this 
view, and Eckersley appears to agree with Fox.68 Bender also gives 
arguments why this cannot be true: for example, anthropocentrism 
historically preceded human domination of other humans. Bender also 
critiques attempts by Clark to defend social ecology’s 
anthropocentrism. Bender points out that Clark now considers himself 
to be a “deep social ecologist.” He has tried to distance himself from 
Bookchin’s position and now claims to support bioregionalism and “an 
extensive expansion of wilderness areas.” But what priority does 
biodiversity protection have (along with the other aspects of the 
ecological crisis) in Clark’s new social ecology orientation? And what 
is the new “deep social ecology” position on human overpopulation, 
“post-scarcity anarchism” (unlimited growth), and humans directing 
evolution by absorbing wild Nature into Culture? Clark now apparently 
supports (along with Michael Zimmerman) Ken Wilber’s 
anthropocentric Hegelian spirituality. Does he agree with Wilber that 
primal people have a less developed form of spirituality?69 Bender 
thinks otherwise. More recently, Clark has sought strong ties with 
ecofeminism. This leads to the question of what Clark’s position is on 
social constructivism, and towards Donna Haraway’s Cyborg 
Manifesto.70  
Clark has recently claimed that my approach and Naess’s differ so 
greatly that they represent two different conceptions of deep ecology.71 
I have critiqued Bookchin’s social ecology over the years for many of 
the reasons mentioned above, whereas Naess (in more Gandhian 
fashion) has tended to be conciliatory. Clark notes that Naess argues for 




concerns (these movements, for Naess, would ideally come together 
and co-operate, insofar as this is possible, under the overall banner of 
the Green movement). I agree with Naess’s tactical approach to this 
issue and Clark does not. Insofar as I am aware, I do not differ with 
Naess on any major deep ecological issue, including the sensitive issue 
of the ecological consequences of overly liberal policies concerning 
immigration from poor to rich countries. Naess has pointed out, for 
instance, that “the children of immigrants will adopt the fatal 
consumption patterns of the rich countries, thereby adding to the 
ecological crisis,” not to mention the added stress on ecosystems and 
social infrastructure these rapidly increasing population pressures are 
causing. In other words, there are limits to growth unless, of course, one 
believes that Culture has totally extricated itself from 
biological/ecological realities (these considerations are sufficiently 
weighty that they cannot be simply dismissed as a “racist” Garrett 
Hardin position). Given the I=PAT equation, environmental scientists 
now refer to America as “the world’s most overpopulated country.” 
And both Jared Diamond and the Ehrlichs have argued that immigration 
into developed countries must be significantly reduced for ecological 
reasons.72 This is a key area in which leftist social justice movements 
(and apparently “second generation” ecophilosophers) appear to stray 
from sound ecological and social policy. Clark also strongly disagrees 
with Naess and me on this. One is finally led to wonder what social 
ecology as an ecophilosophical position would look like if Clark were 
to fully face up to the criticisms made by Eckersley, Fox, Bender, and 
others. 
 
Postmodernism’s Incredible Power Play—It’s All Culture! 
The social constructivism of the postmodernists provides a new and 
novel basis for the resolution of the Culture/Nature issue. There is no 
Nature/Culture dualism—Nature becomes a social construction totally 
dependent on Culture, or Nature become totally assimilated into, or 
eliminated, by Culture. This constitutes an intellectual power-play of 
such magnitude that it makes Bookchin’s grab for power seem 
miniscule by comparison. For example, the Australian zoologist Peter 
Dwyer has claimed: 
Modern thought treats nature as separate from culture and has assigned ontological 
priority to the former . . . I wish to revise, and to some extent up-end this tradition . 
. . I shall argue, in the domain of human affairs [that] culture should be taken as 
prior, nature as emergent.73
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But Culture is not “separate” from Nature unless we are Biblical 
creationists, Hegelian/Marxists, or postmodernist “New Creationists.” 
Humans and their cultures arose through cosmic and biological 
processes, and remain thoroughly embedded in these processes. Bender 
provides extended arguments to support the embeddedness of humans 
in Nature. The Earth and many other species have historical ontological 
priority over humans. In rejecting the scientific account of the 
Universe’s evolution by calling into question the veracity of the 
physical and biological sciences, the postmodernists have indeed “up-
ended” things in an immense power-grab with implications for many 
practical issues (such as the priority of social justice issues over 
ecological issues). They have “up-ended” things to the point where they 
have turned reality on its head—it’s all Culture! Through intellectual 
slight-of-hand, the social sciences now become the primary or “hard 
sciences” while the physical and biological sciences, become the “soft” 
culturally-dependent sciences. To the extent to which this bizarre 
intellectual power coup has been successful, the anthropocentric social 
sciences and humanities are now in the driver’s seat! They now provide 
a new and unique intellectual basis, as a result of their newly acquired 
position of power, for the ecological destruction of the Earth and its 
wildness previously only dreamed of by Old Testament authors and 
modernist Enlightenment thinkers from Bacon, Descartes, Hegel, Marx, 
and Bookchin, to the New Age Silicon Valley cybernetic technotopian 
followers of Teilhard de Chardin. 
As a way of summarizing the critique of anthropocentric 
postmodernism and its potentially devastating social and ecological 
impacts, I would like to refer to Paul Shepard’s insightful little essay, 
“Virtually Hunting Reality in the Forests of Simulacra.” After 
discussing the views of Derrida, Rorty, Lacan, Lyotard, and Foucault, 
Shepard says, 
But is [postmodern deconstruction] really new or is it a continuation of an old, 
antinatural position that David Ehrenfeld has called “the arrogance of humanism?” 
. . . As the tourists flock to their . . . fantasylands, the cynics take refuge from 
overwhelming problems by announcing all lands to be illusory. Deconstructionist 
post-modernism rationalizes the final step away from connection: beyond 
relativism to denial. It seems more like the capstone to an old story than a 
revolutionary perspective. 
And reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “perfect nihilism” (the joyful 
affirmation of “faithfulness to the Earth”) Shepard points out, 
Alternatively, the genuinely innovative direction of our time is not final surrender 
to the anomie of meaninglessness or the escape to fantasylands but in the opposite 




representation. The new humanism is not really radical. As Charlene Spretnak 
says: “The ecologizing of consciousness is far more radical than ideologues and 
strategists of the existing political forms . . . seem to have realized.”74
 
IV. Ecofeminism and the Deep Ecology Movement 
Ecofeminism has been germinating since the mid-1970s, but it burst 
onto the ecophilosophy scene in 1984 with Australian sociologist Ariel 
Salleh’s paper “Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Ecofeminist 
Connection.”75 Several ecofeminists, including Patsy Hallen, have 
pointed out that a large part of the development of ecofeminism has 
been in reaction to deep ecology.76 Most ecofeminists, with the notable 
exception of Charlene Spretnak, Hallen, and a few others, have seen 
ecofeminism (like Bookchin and his social ecology) as being in deadly 
competition with deep ecology. Before the attacks began, deep ecology 
theorists naively looked positively toward both social ecology and 
ecofeminism. Salleh’s paper was the beginning and, with few 
exceptions, ecofeminists have uniformly misunderstood the deep 
ecology movement; as a consequence, most of their criticisms have 
been wide of the mark. For instance, Salleh thought deep ecology is a 
“masculine” rational ethical system (which it isn’t) and that women are 
physically and emotionally closer to Nature than men (it seems obvious 
that, in alienated contemporary cultures, this varies mainly with the 
experiences of the individual man or woman). As a Marxist, Salleh has 
recently tried charitably to “help” deep ecology by suggesting that it de-
emphasize consciousness change, and place more emphasis on the 
“material” conditions of life.77
The issue of masculine deep ecological alienation from Nature (most 
deep ecology theorists are male) has been a major theme of ecofeminist 
criticism to the present. [Since most ecofeminist intellectuals are urban-
oriented postmodernists and social constructivists, it could be argued 
more plausibly that they are among the people of the world most 
alienated from Nature]. The mountain climber/philosopher Jack Turner 
points out that since people who spend lots of time in wild areas and on 
the summits of mountains often take a broad view of reality; it is no 
accident that many leaders of modern conservation (John Muir, David 
Brower, Arne Naess, George Sessions, Gary Snyder) have been 
mountaineers. Brower used to complain that the Sierra Club used to be 
run by mountain climbers but, beginning in the 1980s, it was being run 
by MBAs and other bureaucrats and had lost its boldness and ecological 
vision. Along the same lines, philosopher William Barrett referred to 
Henri Bergson’s remark that “most philosophers seem to philosophize 
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as if they were sealed in the privacy of their study and did not live on a 
planet surrounded by the vast organic world of animals, plants, insects, 
and protozoa, with whom their own life is linked in a single history.” 
Barrett thought that the “first lesson (of trees and rocks) is to draw us 
outside the narrow and presumptuous horizons of our humanism.” 
Although Naess is often referred to as the “father” or “founder” of the 
deep ecology movement, this is misleading. Naess calls marine 
biologist Rachael Carson the founder of the movement. In his original 
1973 deep ecology paper, he points out that “a vast number of people in 
all countries,” many of whom were field ecologists (both men and 
women) who identified with wild Nature, had spontaneously arrived at 
similar deep ecological attitudes and beliefs. Naess saw himself as 
providing the philosophical articulation of a worldwide deep ecological 
movement which had already been in existence for over a decade.78
Cheney, Plumwood, and Warren on Deep Ecology 
Val Plumwood and Karen Warren are two of the most prominent 
contemporary ecofeminist scholars, and they both initially drew heavily 
on the work of Jim Cheney. Cheney introduced postmodernist 
ecofeminism to the ecophilosophy world in the late 1980s. Influenced 
by Donna Haraway, he argued in favour of local bioregional narratives, 
and against the views of Warwick Fox, whom he accused of promoting 
universal rational “cosmic identification,” instead of concern with the 
particular, social, historical, personal, and the “politics of difference.” 
Cheney then developed a convoluted analysis claiming that adherents of 
“Ecosophy-S” (for Stoic or Self-realization, or both)—namely Warwick 
Fox, Bill Devall, Sessions, and to a lesser extent Naess—are engaged in 
a “metaphysical salvational project” which places the deep ecology 
position “beyond the reach of negotiation.” Like the response of the 
Stoics to the shattering of the ancient world, alienated masculine 
adherents of Ecosophy-S want to climb into a metaphysical “tower 
beyond tragedy” (Robinson Jeffer’s phrase) to escape the demise of 
modernism. Of course, it was Naess who initially drew on Spinoza’s 
metaphysical system for inspiration, and Cheney just assumes that 
postmodern deconstruction (with its rejection of metaphysics, truth, 
etc.) is the correct position. But despite Stoic scholar William 
Stephens’s critique of Cheney, which claimed that his comparison of 
deep ecology to Stoicism is inaccurate and that the argument is mostly 
adhominem, it hasn’t deterred ecofeminists from continuing to use it.79   
Karen Warren’s 1999 paper “Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep 
Ecology” is the most recent instance of an ecofeminist critique of deep 
ecology.80 She is aware of the Eight Point platform but begins her paper 




statement of the position, and conflates the two throughout her paper. It 
seems strange that, at this late date, Warren still fails to understand that 
the 1984 Eight Point platform and the Apron Diagram superseded the 
1972 statement. She asserts that the Eight-Point platform itself is “male-
gender” biased, but never really gets around to supporting this claim. 
The main contention of ecofeminism, according to Warren is that “if 
patriarchy would be eliminated . . . so would all the other ‘isms of 
domination’ (including ‘naturism’ or the unjustified domination of 
nonhuman nature by humans), because patriarchy is conceptually tied 
with all these other ‘isms of domination’ through the logic of 
domination.” In reply to Warren, Arne Naess says that he supports the 
elimination of patriarchy, but finds it “difficult to believe” that such an 
occurrence would eliminate the domination of Nature.81  
Fred Bender has perceptively seen through the “ecological pretensions” 
of both social ecology and ecofeminism, and is much more critical than 
Naess of ecofeminism’s central contention. While he holds that 
ecofeminism has made a strong case for the role of patriarchy (and 
oppressive dualisms and frameworks) in the rise of the ecological crisis, 
ecofeminists go “considerably less deeply to the roots of the problem 
than it first appears.” They are mistaken when they think androcentrism 
is more fundamental to the crisis than anthropocentrism: 
anthropocentrism historically preceded the rise of patriarchy. The main 
problem with ecofeminism, according to Bender, is that, like social 
ecology (and the feminist movement in general), its allegiances lie more 
with leftist emancipatory politics than with the ecology movement (a 
movement with “very different intellectual origins”).82
Plumwood’s Critique of Aldo Leopold and Naess’s  
Concept of Self Realization   
Like many ecofeminists, Warren draws heavily on Australian Val 
(Routley) Plumwood’s well known critique of Naess’s concept of Self-
Realization. [In 1973, Plumwood’s ex-husband, Richard Routley 
(Sylvan), had written the first major paper in the field of environmental 
ethics. He advocated Leopold’s land ethic as a formal ethical position. 
Sylvan soon became a major critic of Self-Realization and deep 
ecology’s ontological approach to ecophilosophy].83 Apparently 
thinking she could “clear the decks” for ecofeminism by eliminating the 
inherent “masculine alienation” in the fields of environmental ethics 
and ecophilosophy, Plumwood launched an attack on both Leopold’s 
land ethic and Naess’s Self-Realization Ecosophy T position.  
Plumwood expands on Cheney’s critique to claim that a masculine, 
abstract, rationalistic moral framework is involved in accepting 
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Leopold’s land ethic. Bender argues, however, that Plumwood’s 
critiques of both Leopold and Naess are fundamentally misguided. 
Drawing attention to John Rodman’s interpretation of Leopold (which I 
have also endorsed), Bender argues, contrary to Plumwood, that the 
land ethic should not be separated from the overall context of Sand 
County Almanac—the entire book should be viewed as a rejection of 
anthropocentrism which gradually builds (and leads the reader) to the 
“gestalt-shift” of the land ethic. Therefore, Plumwood is mistaken in 
treating it as a formal ethical theory; Bender argues that Leopold’s 
position is actually a form of “non-dualistic” holistic ecocentrism.84
Plumwood’s critique of deep ecology focuses on Naess’s personal 
Ecosophy-T position (with its norm of Self Realization), mistakenly 
thinking, as Bender points out, that Ecosophy-T and the deep ecology 
movement are the same.85 Relying on postmodernist concepts such as 
the “logic of identity” and “essentialism,” she claims that Self-
realization is guilty of (1) indistinguishability (a monism in which there 
are no boundaries between humans and Nature—humans and nature are 
“identical”), (2) the expanded self (the deep ecology sense of Self is 
essentially the magnified and extended male ego which absorbs and 
obliterates the “other”—a denial of the importance of difference) and 
(3) the transcended or transpersonal self (here Plumwood uses 
Cheney’s critique of Warwick Fox’s view that humans should rise 
above their narrow personal concerns to identify impartially with all 
individual beings). Karen Warren also believes that the “transcended 
self” is one of the most serious short coming of the deep ecological 
approach. When Naess and I use Spinoza’s metaphysical system as a 
source of inspiration, Warren claims that this leads to “a rational 
preoccupation with the universal and the ethical as opposed to the 
particular and the personal.”86
The Failure of Western Intellectuals to Understand Non-Dualism 
Few ecofeminist theorists, other than Charlene Spretnak, seem to be 
familiar with Eastern spiritual/psychological traditions. This also seems 
to be the case with all the critiques of Naess’s concept of Self-
Realization by Western ecophilosophers, from Baird Callicott and Eric 
Katz, to Plumwood and Warren. There are now at least three separate 
and independent critiques of Plumwood (including Bender’s) which all 
claim that she fails to understand the nonduality of Naess’s position.87 
As a result, her criticisms of Self-realization as involving 
“indistinguishability,” the “expanded self,” and the “transcended self,” 




As a former Marxist scholar, Fred Bender’s study of Buddhist spiritual 
discipline, coupled with a concern with the global ecological crisis, 
moved him philosophically to support a deep ecological position. 
Bender describes nondualism as a spiritual and ontological three-step 
growth process of increasing awareness: (1) from egoistic dualism, 
through (2) monism (the awareness that “all is one”), to (3) the re-
emergence of individuals now understood as ontologically embedded 
and interrelated with everything else. In more technical language, 
“ontological particulars re-emerge, as it were, as both interdependent or 
interpenetrating particulars-in-relation and as spatiotemporal 
manifestations of the otherwise unknowable ground of being.” Bender 
considers Lao Tzu, Nagarjuna, Spinoza, Leopold, and Naess, among 
others, to be nondualists. For instance, drawing on Spinoza’s third way 
of knowing, Naess portrays ultimate ontological reality as individuals-
in-relationship, in terms of lower and higher order gestalts.88
Naess characterizes his concept of nondualistic human Self-realization 
as the “ecological self.”89 It is ironic that both Plumwood and Warren 
fail to understand Naess’s nondualism and assert that feminism’s 
“relational self” is the correct account. And, following Naess, they refer 
to the “relational self” as the ecofeminist version of the “ecological 
self.” Bender points out that Plumwood occasionally comes close in her 
descriptions to nondualism, but the “relational self” is actually a 
dualistic feminist abstraction in which one doesn’t relate to Nature 
beyond one’s immediate personal and local surroundings. Bender refers 
to it as “the empathic, caring human individual, otherwise outside of 
nature.” As a way to get beyond the narrow focus of the ecofeminist 
“relational self,” Bender suggests the Gaia hypothesis as an example of 
“non-dual science.” Lovelock and Margulis hypothesize that the entire 
biosphere is one organism: they “argue that everything within the 
ecosphere exists by virtue of its relations to everything else, consistent 
with the nondualist idea of the interdependence of all beings.” It should 
then be possible to identify with the biosphere itself as an organic 
whole. Understood nondualistically, this does not negate each 
individual, as a component member of the whole, seeking its own self-
realization.90 
The most serious problem with ecofeminism, as Bender rightly points 
out, is that “ecofeminists [are] uninterested in, or even hostile toward, 
the idea that a distinctively feminist ethics of nature would draw on 
ecology’s key insights.” Ecofeminism has “failed to grasp ecology’s 
philosophical significance” and, as a result, is “more feminist than 
ecological.”91 The Australian philosopher Patsy Hallen is committed to 
both ecofeminism and deep ecology. No urban armchair academic, she 
has spent significant portions of her life in the Australian outback and 
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in other wild places throughout the world. In her comments on the 
exchange between Warren and Naess, Hallen agrees with Bender (and 
with Warwick Fox’s earlier critique) that ecofeminists are essentially 
preoccupied with feminist social justice issues, while pushing Nature 
and ecological issues into the background. Ecofeminism, she says, 
needs to “foreground wild Nature.”92 But the postmodernist and social 
constructivist orientation of many ecofeminists seems to hinder any 
meaningful ecological understanding on their part, or their acceptance 
of the global scientific ecological consensus. For many ecofeminists, it 
is doubtful that they even begin to understand what Hallen means when 
she refers to ecological “wildness.”  
Karen Warren’s Rejection of Australian/American Deep Ecology 
and Plumwood’s Analysis 
Karen Warren has begun to sense this glaring inadequacy and, seeking 
ecological credentials for ecofeminism, she seems to have rejected 
Plumwood’s critique of both Leopold and Naess. She now holds that 
there needs to be a rapprochement between ecofeminism and Leopold’s 
land ethic.93 She also suggests that Naess’s Self Realization escapes the 
charges Plumwood raises against it. But like social ecologist John 
Clark, Warren seems to want to drive a wedge between Naessian and 
American versions of deep ecology. While Warren now believes that 
Plumwood’s critique of Self-realization (and Cheney’s “neo-Stoicism 
of Ecosophy-S” critique) no longer applies to Naess, she is convinced 
that they do apply to Fox, Devall, and Sessions.94
In his otherwise valuable 1990 book, Warwick Fox claimed that all the 
major deep ecology theorists subscribe to some version of Self-
Realization and, on that basis he concluded that Self-Realization was 
the distinctive characteristic of deep ecology. Fox thereby caused a lot 
of the confusion which resulted in the attacks on Self-Realization.95 He 
then proposed that the term “deep ecology” be dropped, and henceforth 
deep ecology should be considered a form of transpersonal psychology. 
Naess immediately objected, arguing that deep ecology is primarily a 
philosophical/social activist movement and should be characterized 
mainly by the 1984 platform and apron diagram. A rejoinder to Fox, 
which supported Naess’s position and reflected the views of all the 
major deep ecology theorists except Fox, was written and widely 
circulated by Harold Glasser in 1991 (but not published until 1997).96   
Warren’s critique of American/Australian deep ecology is thoroughly 
confused. For one thing, she attributes quotes to Fox which come from 
Naess, so if Fox is indicted by her, then so is Naess. Secondly, she 




ecology theorists (Alan Drengson, Harold Glasser, Andrew 
McLaughlin, Devall, and Sessions) have accepted the 1984 Eight Point 
platform, together with the Apron Diagram which separates “ultimate 
premises” (such as Self-Realization) from the Eight Point platform. So 
the Plumwood/Cheney critiques are no more applicable to them than 
they are to Naess. This information has been readily available in the 
literature.97 In his reply to Warren, Naess just simply remarks that 
Warren has exaggerated the differences between the theorists. 
Ultimately, like Bookchin and Clark, much of this ongoing so-called 
“ecofeminism/deep ecology debate” by Plumwood, Warren, and other 
ecofeminists has amounted to little more than academic “game playing” 
and political power trips involving a “jockeying for position” which has 
basically obfuscated the issues and delayed realistic solutions to the 
ecological crisis.  
This doesn’t detract from Warren’s recent effort (along with Patsy 
Hallen, Charlene Spretnak and Vandana Shiva) to belatedly couple 
ecofeminism with a genuine ecological perspective. Spretnak 
recommended to ecofeminists in the early 1980s that they read G. Tyler 
Miller’s textbook on ecological science, Living in the Environment. She 
has also been a critic of postmodern deconstruction.98 But while Warren 
is trying to ecologize ecofeminism, Donna Haraway is seducing other 
so-called ecofeminists down a technotopian anti-ecological path.  
Haraway’s Cyborg Proposal for the Reinvention (Destruction) of 
Nature: Postmodernism Run Amok 
It’s an extraordinary phenomenon how the West, in contrast with 
Eastern religious/spiritual traditions such as Taoism and Buddhism and 
most primal peoples around the world, developed such an 
anthropocentric Nature-hating tradition and how so few Western 
philosophers over the millennia, with the exception of Nietzsche and 
possibly Rousseau, have managed to escape it. One notable exception 
was the Harvard philosopher George Santayana, who made the most 
radical philosophical proposal of the early twentieth century. In 1911, 
he delivered a speech at UC Berkeley which indicted the 
anthropocentrism of American philosophy and religion, while rejecting 
the orientation of his Hegelian and pragmatist colleagues. He proposed 
an ecocentric revolution for philosophy and Western culture.99  
The leading British philosopher Bertrand Russell (whose orientation, it 
has been argued, was ultimately Spinozist) passed the Second World 
War years reflecting on the development of philosophy in the West, 
which resulted in his monumental A History of Western Philosophy. 
Like Santayana, Russell observed that the philosophies of Dewey and 
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Marx are anthropocentric “power philosophies, and tend to regard 
everything non-human as mere raw material.” Russell concluded that 
these power philosophies, which he traced to Fichte and the Hegelian 
tradition, are intoxicated with technological power over Nature, and this 
intoxication is the most dangerous form of madness in the modern 
world. An objective concept of truth, which Marx and Dewey rejected, 
helped keep the risk of “cosmic impiety” in check. [The parallels here 
with the critiques, which have been made of postmodernism and the 
neo-pragmatists are too obvious to mention!] Finally, Russell issued a 
warning that, almost 50 years later, was to be spelled out in frightening 
detail by the world’s scientists: namely that the desire of Dewey and 
Marx (and others influenced by these traditions) for social power over 
Nature “contributes to the increasing danger of vast social disaster.”100  
It is well known that Aldous Huxley, along with Zamyatin and Orwell, 
warned that the direction of modernity is toward a technological utopia 
that would inevitably be totalitarian. In Brave New World Revisited 
(1959) Huxley took the position that the exponentially increasing 
human population was the main factor leading the world toward 
totalitarianism. Huxley’s new-found interest in ecology led him to write 
the novel Island (1962), a bioregional utopia based on 
spiritual/ecological principles. He claimed that his was “the modest 
ambition to live as fully human beings in harmony with the rest of life 
on this island. . .”101 Huxley, it seemed, would rather be an ecologically 
integrated, organic, fully human being than a cyborg. 
The critiques of postmodernism, social constructivism, and wilderness 
deconstruction converge on the figure of Donna Haraway (of Cyborg 
Manifesto fame). With her radical and “playful” ideas of “transgressing 
the boundaries” of the distinctions (“dualisms”) between humans and 
animals, the physical and non-physical, organisms and machines, and 
male and female, Haraway is an intellectual inspiration for those who 
would turn the Earth into a totally technological human construction. 
As the culmination of Western culture’s biophic alienation from an 
organic wild Earth, this extends for Haraway even to the organic nature 
of the human body. As Michael Zimmerman describes it, “Haraway 
celebrates the merging of the organic with the mechanical, the natural 
with the artificial, so as to code the world in a way that undermines the 
integrity and innocence of the ‘organic whole.’”102
Haraway’s technological utopian ideas are not new. They are 
essentially a feminist and social constructivist reworking of the 
technotopian thinking of Buckminster Fuller and Teilhard de Chardin, 
the intellectual leaders of the New Age movement. In a striking passage 




Technology has a role that is biological . . . From this point of view . . . there 
ceases to be any distinction between the artificial and the natural, between 
technology and life, since all organisms are the result of invention; if there is any 
difference, the advantage is on the side of the artificial . . . the artificial takes over 
from the natural . . . [Human thought] suddenly bursts in, to dominate and 
transform everything on the earth. 
For Teilhard, the Omega Point is reached when the Earth is totally 
enveloped by the “arch-molecule” of humanity living in a 
megatechnologically devised totally artificial environment.103 For both 
Teilhard and Haraway, the ongoing ecological functioning of Nature is 
obliterated as Culture, in the form of technotopia, reigns supreme.  
In his analysis of the development of environmentalism, Fred Buell 
provides a detailed critique of this kind of technotopian fantasizing 
which he refers to as “the culture of hyperexuberance.” On this view 
“global ecocatastrophe becomes, in short, weirdly desirable, even fun.” 
He discusses Haraway and Alvin Toffler as the basis for this kind of 
thinking, as well as Wired magazine’s Kevin Kelly who espouses 
Teilhardian theology to support his views of neobiology, neoevolution, 
cyberbodies, and cyber-ecosystems as a replacement for the organic 
Earth. Wired touted Julian Simon as the “doomslayer.”104 Given that 
Haraway both inspired and was a participant in William Cronon’s 
“Reinventing Nature” conference, is the endorsement of Haraway’s 
anti-ecological cyborgian fantasy what Cronon and his new cadre of 
anthropocentric postmodernist environmental historians are really all 
about? 
Haraway’s interpretation of the world as basically “code” and 
“information,” however, reflects an outdated Baconian/Cartesian 
mechanistic view of science, not more recent organic views of life such 
as the Gaia hypothesis. In keeping with her Marxist heritage, Haraway 
is a technological determinist who promotes such “boundary 
transgressing” technologies as bioengineering, nanotechnology, and 
presumably even the “downloading” of human brains into computers. 
Michael Zimmerman has warned of the impulse toward “death denial” 
which move patriarchal men to try to dominate Nature, and specifically, 
to merge with machines in an effort to avoid the physical death of the 
body and attain immortality. Is this same impulse toward “death denial” 
now manifesting itself in feminists such as Haraway?  
For Haraway, the problem of social justice (particularly the issue of 
equality for women) has a technological solution. If women historically 
have been discriminated against by being identified with Nature, then 
her solution is to eliminate gender. Haraway would have women reject 
their evolutionary organic origins and become cyborgs—part human 
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and part machine. Racial problems can be similarly solved by 
eliminating so-called “racial” characteristics. Jean Paul Sartre would be 
ecstatic—with all natural limits and boundaries transgressed, women 
can lead the technological future toward unlimited creativity and 
freedom. But how does this result in a celebration of “difference” and 
diversity? On the contrary, it seems to lead more toward a 
homogenization of humans and culture of the kind found in the world-
wide American colonization process known as economic globalization.  
The unabashed technological optimism and enthusiasm of Haraway, 
Wired magazine, and the New Age movement for the destruction and 
replacement of the Earth’s ecological systems has blithely managed to 
overlook the very substantial technological critiques of the last 70 
years: from Huxley, Orwell, and Ellul, to the more recent critiques of E. 
F. Schumacher, David Ehrenfeld, Jeremy Rifkin, and Jerry Mander. 
Ecophilosopher Keekok Lee has recently argued that the most serious 
global ecological threat is from those technologies that break down the 
distinction between the natural and the artefactual. It was even more 
sobering for Silicon Valley technotopians when one of their own, Bill 
Joy (chief scientist for Sun Microsystems), warned of the very real 
dangers of self-replicating systems getting out of control; he 
recommended a ban on further robotics, genetic engineering, and 
nanotechnology research. An increasing number of thinkers are calling 
for a moratorium on these kinds of technologies. For instance, 
Sadruddin Aga Khan, the environmentally concerned former UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, claimed that “perhaps the time has come 
to impose a moratorium on new scientific or technological innovations 
that have potentially negative implications for the planet and society.” 
Joy’s analysis and recommendation may have temporarily dampened 
the technotopian’s spirits, but not for long, as research in these fields 
continues to move full speed ahead.105
One might expect the ultra-postmodernist and deep ecology critic Peter 
van Wyck to endorse Haraway’s cyborgism, but it was somewhat of a 
surprise when Michael Zimmerman did so as well.106 Zimmerman is a 
Heideggerian scholar who once emphasized Heidegger’s critique of 
anthropocentric humanism as well as Heidegger’s powerful critique of 
the technological world, thinking Heidegger provided yet another 
philosophical basis for supporting the deep ecology movement. But 
when Heidegger’s close ties with the Third Reich were revealed, 
Zimmerman immediately dropped him, wrote extensively on the 
postmodernist theme of the possible dangers of ecofacism, and 
dramatically reversed his position in the direction of neo-Hegelianism 
[He fortunately concluded in his 1993 Heidegger-Deep Ecology paper 




He concludes Contesting Earth’s Future by supporting a number of 
thinkers he calls “critical postmodernists” that include Ken Wilber, 
Alexander Argyros, and Donna Haraway. Zimmerman points out that 
Argyros (like the Neo-Hegelian Wilber and Haraway) “does not seem 
particularly concerned about the fate of nonhuman life.” Given that 
admission, to what extent can they (and Zimmerman) be construed as 
supporting an ecological position? One is reminded of Teilhard’s anti-
ecological anthropocentric statement that plants and insects have little 
significance since they are not part of the evolutionary development 
toward consciousness, which manifests itself to the highest degree in 
humans.108  
It would have been stimulating to have Donna Haraway and Rachel 
Carson in the same room. One could imagine that one of the more 
interesting topics would be the raising of children. Carson was a strong 
advocate of cultivating a “sense of wonder” in children for the natural 
world and, like Naess, of developing strong ties of identification with 
wild ecosystems, plants, and animals.109 Haraway, I suppose, would 
counter by enlightening Carson on the need to “reinvent Nature,” and 
how she would propose raising children in the electronic world of video 
games, virtual reality and simulated wilderness to prepare them for the 
genderless technotopia of cyborgs and hyper-reality. Jerry Mander 
explains how children raised in our postmodernist carnival world of 
theme parks and hyper-reality, and exposed to a steady diet of 
television and video games, are in a state of confused reality, and being 
perpetually “sped up”—they become “speed junkies.” Nature, by 
contrast, is too slow and boring for them, emotional contact is not 
made, and this helps pave the way for the exploitation of Nature. There 
is increasing concern among the public about the younger generation 
becoming cyborgs by living inside their “electronic bubbles” and 
shutting out the outside world—addicted to cell phones, ipods, laptops, 
and so on. Meanwhile, corporations colonize them through television 
programs and advertising for toddlers, and then MTV for adolescents, 
turning them into American super-consumers.110  
It appears that Karen Warren has her work cut out for her in terms of 
establishing ecofeminism on a solid ecological foundation. Chris 
Cuomo points out that ecofeminists “have flocked to appropriate 
Haraway’s images of anti-dualistic cyborg feminism.”111 Warren also 
needs to be careful that in her enthusiasm for rejecting all dualisms (or 
distinctions), she doesn’t throw out the “dualism” between the natural 
(or the wild) and the artefactual; that would undercut the significance of 
the Leopoldian land ethic and the entire ecological foundation she 
wants to establish. 
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 V. Thoreau, Snyder, and Turner on Wildness 
To ensure the ongoing ecological health of the Earth, there has been a 
renewed interest in the nineteenth century emphasis of Thoreau and 
Muir on wildness. The protection of the Earth’s wildness is now being 
proposed by some ecophilosophers as the central ecocentric issue. For 
example, after discussing the recent controversy over the conflicting 
ecological theories of stability and instability, Ned Hettinger and Bill 
Throop argue that “emphasizing wildness provides the most promising 
general strategy for defending ecocentric ethics.”112  
In The Abstract Wild, Jack Turner does as good a job as anyone of 
deciphering and interpreting the meaning of Thoreau’s radical and 
enigmatic 1851 statement, “In wildness is the preservation of the 
world.”113 Turner expresses his indebtedness to Gary Snyder’s The 
Practice of the Wild which provides a ground-breaking discussion of 
wildness and the “old ways” of primary people from a contemporary 
bioregional perspective.114 Conservationists and environmentalists, over 
the years, have misunderstood Thoreau and frequently misquoted him 
as saying “wilderness” instead of “wildness.” Turner points out that 
they have interpreted wildness as a place (such as legally designated 
wilderness areas) rather than a quality of people, plants and animals, 
and specific places. A certain amount of human habitation does not 
necessarily affect the wildness of an area in a negative way. As Turner 
points out, “A week in the Amazon, the high Arctic, or the northern 
side of the western Himalayas would suggest that what counts as 
wildness and wilderness is determined not by the absence of people, but 
by the relationship of people and place.” The word “wildness” is 
etymologically tied to the ideas of health, wholeness, and liveliness. 
What Thoreau also meant by “wildness” is “self-willed, self-
determined, and self-ordered.” Wilderness should be understood as 
“self-willed land” where ecological processes, and not humans, are 
dominant.115 The concept of wilderness goes way back in history. The 
critiques of Cronon and others, as Turner points out, focus on 
‘wilderness act’ wilderness”—a specific legal designation tailored to fit 
the American situation.  
 In saying that wildness preserves the “world” Thoreau referred to the 
world as cosmos—as a harmonious order. In summarizing this point 
Turner says “so in the broadest sense we can say that Thoreau’s ‘In 
Wildness is the preservation of the World’ is about the relation of free, 
self-willed, and self-determinate ‘things’ with the harmonious order of 




refer to as wildness that has, until quite recently, been the dominant 
characteristic of the Earth and its flora and fauna, and which must now 
be protected from further irreparable destruction.   
Thoreau also links wildness with freedom. In Thoreau’s words, “all 
good things are wild and free.” Much like Naess’s concept of the 
“ecological self,” Turner claims that wildness and freedom for humans 
is a “project of the self.” Thoreau and Turner agree that human freedom 
consists of being “self-willed” and not merely egoistic “social selves” 
moulded by their society. But, in contrast with Sartre’s existentialist 
position that human freedom is unlimited and consists of autonomous 
individuals rejecting and transcending wild Nature, human freedom, for 
Thoreau, also involves being embedded in wild Nature. For Turner, “to 
create a wilder self, the self must live the life of the wild, mould a 
particular form of character, a form of life . . . from this vision of a wild 
order in complete interdependence comes freedom.”117 According to 
Thoreau, humans must “rejoin the natural world,” experience 
themselves as “part and parcel” of wild Nature, and live bioregionally 
as harmonious parts of biotic communities. In order to attain this wild 
freedom and nondualistic perception, and minimize socially sanctioned 
greed which is the basis of much environmental destruction, Turner (a 
practicing Buddhist) claims, along the lines of Naess and Zen 
Buddhism, that we must also integrate a spiritual practice into our 
lives.118
The Amazon Basin, Vogel, and the Death of Nature 
A major controversy has been brewing for years among geographers, 
anthropologists, and cultural historians over the extent to which the 
Earth has been modified historically by humans. As Charles Mann 
points out in an Atlantic Monthly article, some scholars claim that there 
were over 10 million indigenous people in North America before 
European contact. These huge populations were decimated by European 
diseases which gave early settlers the impression that North America 
was a vast sparsely populated wilderness. Given these huge 
populations, together with other archaeological evidence, some social 
scientists now argue that indigenous people “were so successful at 
imposing their will on the landscape that in 1492 Columbus set foot in a 
hemisphere thoroughly dominated by humankind.” Parts of the Western 
hemisphere were as civilized as Europe. In parts of South America, 
human impact was so great that some anthropologists claim, for 
example, that the Amazon Basin “is a cultural artifact.” Mann draws out 
the political and ecological implications of this by referring to Cronon, 
Callicott, and “the great wilderness debate.” And Donna Haraway and 
other social constructivists draw on these controversies to argue that 
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social justice concerns should prevail in these areas previously thought 
to be pristine wilderness. Environmentalists and conservation 
biologists, the argument goes, have been fooled; there is no wildness 
there to be saved, so the development of these areas as human resources 
should continue.119
It is instructive, in connection with the above, to examine the argument 
of philosopher Steve Vogel against the central claim Bill McKibben 
makes in The End of Nature. McKibben argued that because global 
warming now affects every area of the Earth, the entire Earth has 
become man-made and artificial. Vogel interprets McKibben to mean 
that a Nature independent of humans has ended—“a world untouched 
by human action no longer exists.”120 McKibben’s claim was not 
particularly well thought out, and he became easy prey for Vogel’s 
critique. But by the time Vogel draws the conclusion that Nature has 
failed to exist ever since humans began transforming it, it should have 
occurred to Vogel that something about his interpretation of McKibben 
had gone seriously wrong. Vogel is enthusiastic about eliminating 
Nature (or the concept of Nature), and says he uses these arguments to 
convince his students that Nature does not, and never did, exist. 
[Students suffer through enough ecological nonsense in their economics 
and forestry classes. But what is now happening these days, at the 
hands of teachers like the social constructivists, to the basically sound 
intuitions of students concerning the destruction of Nature and the wild 
world? Sir Karl Popper’s remark, made in the early 1970s, seems 
particularly appropriate to both Vogel and the social constructionists: 
“the greatest scandal of philosophy is that, while all around us the world 
of nature perishes—and not the world of nature alone—philosophers 
continue to talk, sometimes cleverly and sometimes not, about the 
question of whether this world exists.”121]   
The most glaring problem with Vogel’s position is the straw man 
disjunction he sets up—either Nature is totally pristine (literally 
untouched by human hands), or Nature doesn’t exist. Thoreau’s 
characterization of wildness (and wild Nature) cuts neatly through 
Vogel’s disjunction—namely by referring to wild Nature as Nature 
which is “self-willed” and not dominated by humans (not as Nature 
“untouched by human hands”). Hettinger and Throop make the very 
important point that we need to think in terms of a continuum, with 
“virtually pristine” (Gary Snyder’s phrase) wild environments at one 
end, and totally human dominated and developed environments at the 
other (such as cities and large-scale agriculture where most wildness 
has been largely suppressed or eliminated). As Cronon and his 
colleagues are apparently unable to do, we need to be able to 




Wildlife Refuge. Wild environments will shade off into increasingly 
more human dominated environments as we approach the center of the 
continuum. This reflects the ecological reality of the situation, and 
avoids unrealistic and misleading dichotomies such as Vogel’s.122
This same point applies to the arguments about the prior civilizing of 
the Amazon Basin and other areas throughout the Western hemisphere. 
Unlike most of Europe, these areas were not totally dominated by 
indigenous people. Enough wildness and wild species remained that, 
after these civilizations failed, wild Nature gradually and spontaneously 
reasserted itself. Hettinger and Throop describe this process as 
humanization being “washed out” of these natural systems: “early 
human influence on a system is dampened by intervening epochs with 
little impact. A system can recapture previous levels of wildness as 
human influence diminishes.”123 Other biologists refer to this as 
“rewilding,” whether this occurs spontaneously or as the result of 
deliberate and painstaking efforts to restore an area with native 
species—what is called “ecological restoration.” And so the arguments 
about the extent to which the Western hemisphere was altered by earlier 
indigenous people and civilizations are interesting but largely irrelevant 
to the efforts to protect now existing wild ecosystems. Biologists have 
not been fooled. They are capable of recognizing biologically diverse 
functioning wild ecosystems (such as those in the Amazon basin) when 
they see them. Countless biologists since Leopold’s time have spent 
their careers in the field studying the remaining wild ecosystems of the 
world. Now many have become conservation biologists in an effort to 
try to save them. Hettinger and Throop also show how Baird Callicott, 
who seems to have an aversion to wildness, has modified Leopold’s 
land ethic to accommodate ecological instability in a way that results in 
unacceptable consequences.   
Jack Turner describes himself as a fundamentalist when it comes to 
wild Nature, and most deep ecology supporters are, no doubt, in 
sympathy with this. But his critique of the conservation biologist’s 
Wildlands Project for North America (enlarging wilderness areas and 
connecting them with corridors) is thought-provoking and important 
although somewhat overstated. Protecting biodiversity and protecting 
wildness are not necessarily the same, Turner points out, and 
conservation biologists seem more concerned with the former than with 
the latter. Like Callicott and Nelson, biologists are too eager to manage 
these areas, and wildness and human management, he claims, are 
incompatible. Citing Foucault, Turner points out that human control, 
management, and domination are what modernity is all about, and 
biologists all-to-often have not emancipated themselves from this mind-
set. Conservation biologists counter that many wild areas are too small, 
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ecologically fragile, and disconnected at this point to sustain 
themselves, and require various amounts of management. Also there is 
the increasing problem of invasive species. Given the current crisis state 
of wild ecosystems around the world, a certain degree of management 
in some cases seems like a practical necessity. It is important to 
distinguish between interim emergency measures, and more long-term 
desirable goals.124 
Turner’s warnings about the dangers of biologists being “control-
obsessed” should certainly be taken to heart by them, and a concern for 
maintaining wildness should be uppermost in their minds, along with 
biodiversity protection. Unlike ecosystem computer-modeling 
ecologists and others, it is doubtful that most field ecologists and 
conservation biologists view wild plants and animals mechanistically as 
merely “information” or genetic “codes,” or primarily as genetic raw 
material for pharmaceutical corporations—in other words, as merely 
“resources” for human use. It’s likely that most field ecologists were 
drawn to extended ecosystem field studies (with being out in wild 
Nature for extended periods of time) out of a love and respect for wild 
Nature, and that most biologists respect the dignity, “otherness,” and 
rights to self-realization of the creatures they work with. Turner goes 
too far when he compares the Wildlands Project with the power-
tripping biophobic “wise use” plans of Daniel Botkin (and Cronon and 
the social constructivists) for “reinventing” Nature. 
The great insight of Thoreau and Muir was that wildness preserves the 
world and all its inhabitants. From a “practical” survival standpoint, 
this means that the sum total of all the wild ecosystems of the Earth (the 
biosphere) is literally the “life support system” of the Earth and all its 
species. Less obvious, but just as important, wildness defines freedom, 
health, and “aliveness” for both humans and non-humans. It’s the 
primal force that moves the living world. Wildness must be experienced 
and lived, which is why, as Western culture has become overly civilized 
and technological, there is less and less understanding of what is being 
lost. 
Recently, Turner has taken a position very similar to Keekok Lee’s—
that biotechnology, nanotechnology, and other “technologies of 
replacement” pose an immediate threat to the wild ecosystems of the 
Earth. He focuses specifically on transgenic forests and salmon since 
these changes are immanent. Turner is concerned that some 
environmentalists will be seduced into approving biotechnological fixes 




 E. O. Wilson, Arne Naess, and Nils Eldredge on Protecting 
Wildness 
Harvard’s E. O. Wilson and Paul Ehrlich have been an inspiration for 
many people in the field of conservation biology. But Turner’s worries 
about environmentalists accepting biotechnological fixes seem to be 
confirmed by Wilson’s view that genetically engineered crops will keep 
the world’s 10 billion people fed throughout the twenty-first century. 
Wilson also claims that up to 50 per cent of the Earth could eventually 
be protected as biodiversity and wildlife sanctuaries. And Wilson’s and 
Norman Myers’s strategy for protecting biodiversity by setting aside 
biodiversity “hot spots” around the Earth has been challenged by Nils 
Eldredge, and by studies cited by the Ehrlich, as being totally 
inadequate.126 The British environmental journalist Fred Pearce rightly 
points out that Wilson tends to be politically naive in thinking that free 
market capitalism (and biotechnology) will provide realistic solutions to 
the ecological crisis. Wilson seems to be in denial about the role of the 
United States as a major cause of the world’s current social and 
ecological crisis. He suggests that the trajectory of globalization is 
inevitable (which involves continued growth and high consumption 
patterns) and believes in corporate capitalism’s capacity to alter itself in 
ecologically benign ways. Wilson is also criticized for his apparent lack 
of concern and sensitivity for the poor people living in and around 
proposed wilderness/biodiversity sanctuaries.127
In the late 1980s, Arne Naess held a position similar to Wilson’s when 
he suggested that a good ecological mix for the Earth would be about 
1/3 uninhabited wilderness (wildlife sanctuaries), 1/3 “free nature 
(sparse human inhabitation where wildness predominates), and 1/3 
human dominated landscapes (cities and intensive agriculture).128 In 
response to Ramachandra Guha, Naess revised his views in terms of the 
amount of area that needed to be protected in human-free sanctuaries. 
In his 1991 reply to Guha (“The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep 
Ecology”), Naess pointed to “some people” who think deep ecology is a 
form of Western “neo-colonialism” that proposes to force Third World 
people out of their homes to make room for “spectacular animals.”129 
Naess refers to Gary Snyder’s point (in The Practice of the Wild) that, 
throughout history, humans have lived in wilderness in moderate 
numbers without appreciably reducing biological richness and diversity. 
But, he argued, this is now not possible in rich countries such as the 
United States where high-consumption lifestyles, and other destructive 
practices, require the establishment of large designated wilderness to 
protect wild ecosystems and biodiversity. Apart from the desperately 
poor, Naess believes that most people in the Third World do care about 
the protection of wildness and biodiversity. Wildlife sanctuaries can be 
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established where appropriate, but some of the protection could consist 
of people living traditionally in ecologically benign ways in sparsely 
inhabited “free nature.” But since the poor can’t keep moving into the 
forests and destroying them, Naess suggests that the continuing severe 
overpopulation in Third World countries will require new redesigned 
cities for these additional people to live in. 
Niles Eldredge has proposed a strategy which combines some of the 
features of Wilson’s and Naess’s strategies. Eldredge emphasizes that 
everything possible must be done to stabilize the human population by 
humane means. In addition, “the cycle of endlessly expanding 
farmland” to feed more and more people must be broken. He and Naess 
also have no doubts about the role of high consumption patterns in the 
ecological crisis. Eldredge disagrees with Wilson that globalization can 
help solve our problems -the living standards of the poor must be 
raised, but “global economic development is sheer fantasy, a pipe 
dream.” Eldredge also argues that Wilson’s call for protecting the 
biodiversity “hot spots” of the world does not go far enough. For 
Eldredge, protecting the biodiversity “hot spots” is very important, but 
an overemphasis on that tends to “minimize the sheer extent of habitat 
that we ought to be conserving.” Major emphasis must be placed on 
wild ecosystem protection, not just on saving species and biodiversity. 
Further, local people who are affected by establishing preserves must be 
involved in these efforts. He points out that “conservation, in short, is 
doomed unless the economic interests and well-being of local peoples is 
taken into central consideration.” He considers “ecotourism” as 
practiced, for example, in Costa Rica to be one option. But Eldredge 
cautions that it is no “panacea”—the effects of tourists on the preserves 
disrupts the wildlife and negatively impacts the ecosystems.130
The solutions proposed by Wilson, Naess, Eldredge, and others are 
messy ones in a world marked by increasing multiple crisis situations. 
As the decades have gone by since ecologists first began warning of 
human overpopulation, and wild ecosystem and species loss, ecosystem 
destruction has increased exponentially and the solutions have grown 
messier, more desperate, and more difficult to implement. But there is 
no realistic alternative to protecting what is left of the wild world. 
As a refreshing contrast with William Cronon and the postmodern 
historians, Donald Worster takes sides with Wilson, Naess, Ehrlich, and 
Eldredge: 
we must make as our first priority in dealing with the earth the careful and strict 
preservation of the billion-year-old heritage achieved by the evolution of plant and 




and ecosystems that we possibly can. We must not, through our actions, cause any 
more species to become extinct.131
 
VI. Frederick Bender on the Future of Deep Ecology 
Frederick Bender concludes The Culture of Extinction by proposing a 
major revision of the deep ecology position. His view is that Naess 
made a fundamental mistake when he revised the original 1973 
characterization of the deep ecology movement and replaced it, in 1984, 
with the more philosophically neutral Eight Point platform. The 1973 
version included the nondualistic statement of the “relational total-field 
image—organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic 
relations.”132 Naess also dropped the “anti-class” (social justice) clause. 
In his proposed revision of deep ecology, Bender reinstates those 
aspects of the original 1973 formulation, and much more, in a well 
thought out and complex restatement of both the Apron Diagram and 
the Eight Points. He wants deep ecology to be a comprehensive 
philosophical position based on nondualism. As a partial justification 
for these changes, he points to Naess’s claim that the deep ecology 
platform was supposed to provide a basis for “changing everything.”133 
And referring to Warwick Fox’s proposal for changing deep ecology in 
the direction of a transpersonal psychology, Bender also argues that the 
real “depth” of deep ecology is not in Naess’s insistence on “deep 
questioning,” but mainly in the depth provided by its nondualistic 
philosophical orientation. Without this broader comprehensiveness, 
deep ecology runs the risk of being an “ecology-only” movement which 
lacks the resources for transforming the Culture of Extinction.134 
First of all, Bender’s comment about “changing everything” needs to be 
put into context. In his 1991 paper, “Politics and the Ecological Crisis,” 
Naess tells us that Rachel Carson (from whom he dates the beginning of 
the deep ecology movement) insisted that everything, not just politics, 
needs to be changed. He agrees with Carson, although later adding the 
proviso “everything except democratic forms of government.” In this 
paper, Naess was contrasting Carson’s position with the slogan of the 
neo-Marxist and Frankfurt School (from which the New Left positions 
of Marcuse and Bookchin emerged) that “everything is politics.”135 And 
so, one of the key points Naess is making about the deep ecology 
movement standing for “changing everything” is that, unlike the almost 
totally political orientation of the neo-Marxists, the ecological crisis 
calls into question fundamental philosophical issues, such as the 
anthropocentric orientation of Western culture and the intrinsic value of 
wild ecosystems and species, which have to be addressed. Further, the 
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narrow (or “shallow”) “urban pollution” analysis of the crisis, made by 
the New Left and mainstream environmentalism, fails to uncover the 
extent to which more radical social changes need to be made.  
Naess remains insistent on the importance of “deep questioning” for the 
deep ecology movement. One main reason is his belief that motivation 
for effective ecological activism comes from deep religious and 
philosophical principles. Activists need to arrive at, and acknowledge 
these, through the “deep questioning” process. Fundamental principles 
also provide the basis for “total views.” Naess holds that everyone has a 
total view whether they know it or not. Total views provide the basis 
for one’s “life’s philosophy” and also for understanding the ecological 
“big picture. Total views can also be revealed by deep questioning.136 
Concerning Bender’s desire for a comprehensive position, Naess’s 
personal “Ecosophy T” position stands as a kind of schemata (or 
template) for a comprehensive deep ecology position (which includes a 
social justice component), but Naess does not wish to impose it on 
others. He genuinely believes in a diversity of world views (similar to 
the best of postmodernist thinking) and, as Bender realizes, Naess 
wants to attract as many diverse religious and philosophical positions as 
possible to provide support for the deep ecology movement. These are 
all important considerations why deep ecology should not present itself 
as a comprehensive position, or grand “global narrative.” 
Bender perhaps unwittingly comes close to one of the main reasons for 
Naess’s change to the 1984 platform, when he points out that deep 
ecology runs the risk of becoming an “ecology-only” movement. In a 
broad sense, this is what Naess proposes for the deep ecology 
movement. Given the very aggressive anthropocentric and anti-
ecological stance and tactics of the Marxist-inspired social justice 
movements, I think Naess believes that at least one movement has to 
stand for an undiluted ecological position. As has been documented 
throughout this paper, the social justice movements have succeeded in 
many cases, in co-opting the agenda of the ecology/environmental 
movements. In contrast with the left’s exclusively oriented urban 
pollution/environmental social justice agenda (and emphasis on race, 
class, and gender), Naess emphasizes that a major goal of the deep 
ecology movement is promoting ecological sustainability (in contrast 
with the concept of sustainable development) by which he means 
protecting “the full richness and diversity of life forms on the planet. It 
is beneath human dignity,” he claims, “to aspire to less.”  
For Naess, the deep ecology movement, the peace movement and the 
social justice movements should be viewed as separate social 




should, join forces (to help “change everything”) under the overall 
banner of the Green movement. In support of this position, he says that 
“considering the accelerating rate of irreversible ecological destruction 
worldwide, I find it acceptable to continue fighting for ecological 
sustainability whatever the state of affairs may be concerning the other 
two goals of Green societies [peace and social justice].” Supporters of 
the deep ecology movement, he claims, “should concentrate on specific 
issues relating to the ecological crisis (including its social and political 
consequences.)”137 More recently, he points out that “the 
interdependence [of the three movements] does not eliminate their 
differences: We cannot be activists in all of them. We must choose. 
Support all, but work mainly in one.”138 I think that Naess’s strategy for 
keeping the deep ecology movement focused specifically on the 
ecological crisis as we understand it through the global ecological 
scientific consensus is sound.  
Deep Ecology as a Philosophical Activist Movement 
This leads to the concerns of the editors of Beneath the Surface (David 
Rothenberg, Andrew Light, and Eric Katz) that “Naess, though a 
philosopher, has often stressed that he is more interested in deep 
ecology as a political and social movement than as a philosophy.” These 
editors are more interested in critiques of the “philosophy” of deep 
ecology than in the “specific policy issues” addressed by the deep 
ecology movement. But even here, given that Rothenberg was a close 
collaborator with Naess for a number of years in Norway, he could have 
provided a considerable service in heading off the many mistakes in 
interpretation by a great number of the authors. They also could have 
done a much more accurate job of describing “the” philosophy of deep 
ecology in their introduction.139  
Michael Zimmerman has argued that the deep ecology movement has 
been closely identified with the 1960s’ countercultural and New 
Paradigm utopian visions. Deep ecology, he claims, is a form of 
utopianism and is thus subject to all the criticisms made of utopianism 
by postmodernists.140 The Devall-Sessions book has a chapter on 
“ecotopia,” which includes discussions of the utopian ideas of Huxley, 
Callenbach, Shepard, and others, but it begins with the observation by 
Paul Sears that utopian thought can also be thought of as “a critique of 
defects and limitations of society and an expression for something 
better.”141 Perhaps the bioregionalism of Gary Snyder and others can be 
viewed as a kind of utopianism, which is an important aspect of deep 
ecological activism. But by the time Naess had revised the deep 
ecology position in 1984, it was becoming increasingly clear that 
society was not going to undergo any drastic change in an ecological 
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direction. Naess and other theorists of the deep ecology movement have 
become more pragmatic recently in terms of trying to devise strategies 
to protect wild Nature, and to head off the worst of the ecological crisis. 
Some of Naess’s key papers along these lines are “Politics and the 
Ecological Crisis” and “Deep Ecology for the 22nd Century,” which are 
concerned with the possibilities of Green societies in the future. But the 
main emphasis is on “overcoming the still-increasing ecological crisis.” 
The deep, long-range ecology movement, since its beginnings with 
Aldo Leopold, Dave Brower, Rachel Carson, and Paul Ehrlich, has 
been an ecophilosophical activist movement primarily concerned with 
seeking humane, but realistic, social and political solutions to the global 
ecological crisis. Conservation biology is a natural continuation of the 
ecological activism begun by Carson, Ehrlich, and others. Naess’s 
efforts have been directed toward describing the deep ecology 
movement since its beginnings in the 1950s and ’60s (both in his 1973 
and 1984 formulations), trying to develop a consistent philosophical 
basis for this movement and, together with other deep ecology 
theoreticians, critiquing various environmental strategies and proposing 
alternative strategies for coping with the ecological crisis. The British 
environmental journalist Joanna Griffiths suggests that a revitalized 
deep ecology movement needs “a popular mantra for a more cynical, 
distracted age.”142
The Future: A Cyborgian/New Age Technotopia or a Wild Earth? 
Traditional societies ascribe identity on the basis of ethnic and tribal traditions, 
modern societies on the basis of the sovereign state and the market economy. The 
post-modern world will discover that the true basis of our identity is our 
membership in a species interconnected with all other species—a foundation far 
more universal than race, gender, ethnicity or anything partial and restricted. 
Richard Falk, Political Science, Princeton University  
 
In his critique of deep ecology, Bron Taylor approvingly quotes Dan 
Deudney’s claim that deep ecology should go beyond local bioregional 
concerns to support global solutions to the ecological crisis.143 Taylor 
appears to be largely unfamiliar with Naess’s writings, and tends to 
view deep ecology through the prism of the Earth First! movement. 
Since the 1980s, Naess has repeatedly stressed that ecological problems 
are increasingly global in scope and must also be dealt with on a global 
basis: we must “think and act globally, regionally, and locally.”144 




United Nations. For example, Naess cites the Bern convention in 
connection with his claim that “with increased education, combined 
with economic progress in the Third World, the goal is not only to halt 
the excessive rate of extinction of animals and plants but also to protect 
whole ecosystems and ensure the continuation of evolution [in other 
words, the protection of the Earth’s wildness].”145
The United Nations’ initial position on the environment was exemplary. 
In 1982, the General Assembly adopted the ecocentric World Charter 
for Nature which asserted that every form of life has intrinsic value, and 
that “Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be 
disrupted.” Unfortunately, a former UN official, Sadruddin Aga Khan 
paints a gloomy picture of the recent United Nations approach to 
protecting the environment. The already flawed concept of ecological 
sustainability has deteriorated into highly exploitive concepts such as 
“sustainable use” and “sustainable consumption.” The United Nations, 
he claims, has increasingly aligned itself with the multinational 
corporations, to the detriment of both the environment and the poor, and 
has become little more than an enforcement agency for the global 
economy.146
At this point in history, there is every reason to believe that humanity 
stands at an absolutely crucial and unprecedented crossroads. In his 
best-selling 1992 book, Earth in the Balance, Al Gore proposed the 
only sane course of action when he claimed that concern for protecting 
the environment and solving the ecological crisis should become “the 
central organizing principle for civilization.”147 He laid out the global 
scientific ecological concerns: overpopulation and species extinction. 
He devotes many pages to discussing the dysfunctional American way 
of life as a result of its addition to consumption, and also warns of 
relying exclusively on technofixes. 
As the result of the latest furor over global warming, “peak oil,” and 
Gore’s global warming video An Inconvenient Truth, the latest issue of 
Newsweek magazine trumpets “the new greening of America.” The talk 
is mostly of hybrid cars and alternative energy sources.148 The May 
2006 issue of Wired magazine has a picture of Gore on the cover with 
the sub-titles “the Pro-Growth, Pro-Tech Fight to Stop Global 
Warming, and “Al Gore and the Rise of the Neo-Greens. “The “Neo-
Greens” however are “eco-capitalist,” hybrid car, solar panel types who 
find their personal identity in leading “eco-chic” lifestyles and wearing 
eco-designer clothing. Is the “new greening of America” and the world 
going to be merely another in a long line of shallow cosmetic responses, 
or finally an awareness of the need for deep change? As part of his 
strategy, Nils Eldgredge says that we need to use the media. A 
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tremendous effort to educate the world to a comprehensive 
understanding of the ecological crisis is obviously required. 
And some people are waking up to what Teilhardian/Haraway artificial 
technotopian utopias are all about. For example, the activist lawyer 
Andrew Kimbrell points to biotechnology’s attempt to “remake life in 
technology’s image”—a kind of “techno-genesis.” Two British 
academics, Lee-Anne Broadhead and Sean Howard, have made an 
impassioned plea for a moratorium on nanotechnology and the 
“nanobots” that would “eat” the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
They are alarmed that “the end of the natural world is, incredibly, the 
explicit, celebrated goal of much pro-nanotechnology literature and 
propaganda. But what if the end of the natural world proves to be the 
death of us all?”149 To extend Bertrand Russell’s warning, perhaps the 
greatest madness in the contemporary world is not only “an intoxication 
with power over Nature,” but the belief of the technotopians that we 
don’t need the wild ecosystems of the Earth to sustain life, and that 
technologists have the ability to successfully replace these systems. One 
interesting question is whether Gore will stick to his ecological 
commitment to protecting the natural world, or whether he will slide 
into the technotopian thinking of the Wired magazine/Silicon Valley 
way of thinking. The public should be made fully aware of the issues 
involved in whether a realistic future for humanity lies in protecting a 
wild Earth, or in becoming cyborg/technotopians? To the scientists of 
the global scientific ecological consensus, it is clear that the widely 
popular attempt to turn the Earth into a cyborgian artificial technotopia 
will result in the final sealing of the fate of both humanity and the 
Earth. As Paul Shepard prophetically warned in 1969 “affirmation of its 
own organic essence will be the ultimate test of the human mind.”150   
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